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I. INTRODUCTION
Our American criminal justice system is too often described as bro-
ken.1 It was not a clean break in a single, isolated location. Instead,
our criminal justice system suffers from many, many little nicks,
bumps, and bruises at the hands of its keepers. The evolution of sen-
tencing enhancements within our criminal justice system represents
the latest nagging, reoccurring injury. In the ultimate Trojan horse to
criminal defendants, the Supreme Court sought to protect the individ-
ual rights of the accused with its recent decisions on sentencing en-
hancements.2 But at the hands of lawmakers, the judiciary, and
prosecutors, criminal defendants suffer more. Our criminal justice sys-
tem also suffers from practices related to sentencing enhancements
and the resulting wave of wrongful convictions by guilty plea.3
1. Recently, “broken” criminal justice has been a familiar headline. See, e.g.,
James Downie, Yes, the American Justice System is Broken, WASH. POST (Dec. 5,
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2014/12/05/yes-the-
american-justice-system-is-broken/ [http://perma.cc/HK68-VW2E]; cf. Reetu Mody,
The Criminal Justice System Is Not Broken, It’s Doing Exactly What It’s Meant to Do,
KENNEDY SCH. REV. (Dec. 5, 2014), http://harvardkennedyschoolreview.com/the-
criminal-justice-system-is-not-broken-its-doing-exactly-what-its-meant-to-do/ [http://
perma.cc/67L2-A94K].
2. See infra Part IV (arguing that the Supreme Court sought to protect individual
rights, not streamline guilty pleas or assist the government at trial and in plea negotia-
tions); see, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 258 (2005) (holding that certain
aspects of the Federal Sentencing Act were incompatible with the Sixth Amendment,
requiring severance).
3. See generally Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhance-
ments in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1148–80 (2001) (criticizing
sentencing enhancements after the Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), for compelling the defendant to deal with sentencing
considerations pretrial and tainting plea negotiations).
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The Sad Reality of Sentencing Enhancements
A crime occurs outside of a crowded movie theater on a Friday night. The
witness accounts are as scattered as the witnesses themselves after the knife was
brandished at approximately 10:15 pm. Many of the witnesses recount an as-
sault that began in a familiar way: two men bumped shoulders, words were
exchanged, and the situation escalated unnecessarily while others encouraged
the altercation or failed to intervene. The victim of the stabbing offers only
vague details about the attack and attacker. For the police to decipher what
happened and arrive at a suspect, it will be difficult. Even with some breaks,
investigating and prosecuting this case appears challenging and problematic.
Nonetheless, law enforcement finds a suspect from the patchwork of witness
accounts and limited other evidence. A young man is arrested, invokes his
rights, refuses to offer a statement, and retains an attorney to begin the hard
work of their exploring viable defenses at trial. The government’s challenges at
trial include proving identity in the crowd once the knife was introduced and
offering unbiased witness testimony. Putting the issues of identity and bias
aside, the exchange between the defendant and victim is equally unclear and
raises trial issues related to proving intent and self-defense.
The young man, at this stage, is not interested in a plea to a felony assault
charge. Contrary to the overwhelming number of cases in our criminal justice
system,4 this case may merit the time, expense, and energy of an increasingly
rare jury trial. Counsel for the defendant negotiates pretrial with the prosecu-
tion but, per the client’s wishes, counsel informs the government that his client
wishes to proceed to trial.
Despite the muddled facts, this case likely will not go to trial. The govern-
ment, in fact, will compel the young man to accept the plea to felony assault.
Counsel could have filed motions alleging constitutional violations and at-
tempting to exclude evidence at trial. Counsel could have mounted a defense,
put on evidence and called witnesses including the defendant. Counsel could
have made arguments creating doubt in the jurors’ minds. The young man,
unfortunately, will plead guilty without any changed circumstances to the evi-
dence on the underlying assault. He will plead guilty without any adverse rul-
ing from the court and before a jury is ever empaneled.
Why? What changed?
Prior to that night at the movie theater, state lawmakers enacted
sentencing enhancement legislation.5 Intending to appear “tough on
crime” before their constituency and control sentencing outcomes, the
4. Over 90% of all criminal cases are resolved by guilty pleas and the number is
significantly higher in the federal system. Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead
Guilty, 61 N.Y. REV. BOOKS 16, 16 (2014) (“In 2013, while 8 percent of all federal
criminal charges were dismissed (either because of a mistake in fact or law or because
the defendant had decided to cooperate), more than 97 percent of the remainder were
resolved through plea bargains, and fewer than 3 percent went to trial. The plea bar-
gains largely determined the sentences imposed.”).
5. In this Article, the Author uses the illustration of California’s sentencing en-
hancement that covers when criminal activity is “for the benefit of . . . any criminal
street gang.” CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22 (West 2014). In 1988, California enacted the
Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act, commonly known as the STEP
Act. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 186.20–.26 (West 2014).
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legislators shifted criminal justice and impinged the individual rights
of the accused.6 What changed? The entire game changed.
Here, the government’s tactical use of a sentencing consideration re-
lated to the defendant’s alleged motive to commit the crime can
change the entire case as early as the initial plea discussions. In the
above illustration, the government dictated a guilty plea not based
upon a cooperating witness, new evidence, or the prospect of addi-
tional charges. The government threatened that, if he wished to pro-
ceed to trial, the government would also allege a sentencing
enhancement about his motive of the assault—likely that the crime
was committed for the “benefit of a gang.” Instead, as is now common
practice, the government’s threatened use of a sentencing enhance-
ment—a fact or set of circumstances which may legislatively increase
the sentence post-conviction—forced the defendant’s hand into a
guilty plea.
The young man may have defenses and arguments as to this sen-
tencing allegation as well. Those will go unheard. As discussed in
greater detail below, he will face the assault allegations and “for the
benefit of a gang” sentencing consideration at the same trial, before
the same jury, and at the same time.7 The prosecutor’s threat to allege
a sentencing consideration effectively ends the underlying assault case
and strong-arms another guilty plea.
The Supreme Court paved the way for this all-too-common plea
bargaining practice. Beginning in the early 1990s through 2004, the
Court considered the constitutionality and procedure associated with
sentencing enhancements.8 Ironically, in a decade of decisions, the
Court sought to confer more procedural safeguards to protect the
rights of the criminally accused. It is critical to understand that the
Court attempted to protect the criminal defendant at sentencing, not
streamline the system for more guilty pleas and short-hand justice. It
was not supposed to work this way.
The lawmakers failed to balance the rights of the criminal defen-
dant with sentencing enhancement legislation.9 In fact, most sentenc-
ing enhancement laws are devoid of procedure and safeguards for the
6. In a prophetic article, one commentator viewed the earliest conversion of sen-
tencing factors to offense elements as unconstitutional. See Jacqueline E. Ross, Unan-
ticipated Consequences of Turning Sentencing Factors into Offense Elements: The
Apprendi Debate, 12 FED. SENT’G REP. 197, 198–202 (2000) (arguing that the ele-
ments rule will prejudice defendants at trial, lead to collusive bargaining over sentenc-
ing facts, encourage legislative circumvention, and breed uncertainty and litigation).
7. See infra Part IV (discussing the perfect storm for the accused when his due
process and fair trial rights are afforded to him at the same time, before the same jury
that hears his underlying case).
8. See infra Part II (discussing the history of the Supreme Court decisions that
have considered sentencing enhancements).
9. The Author notes in this Article that state legislators who promulgate sentenc-
ing enhancement legislation uniformly fail to include any procedural safeguards. See
infra Part IV.
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accused. The judiciary must, at the very least, ensure the accused is
not more disadvantaged at his trial on the underlying allegations due
to sentencing enhancements.10 As argued here, the judiciary fails to
do so.11 State appellate courts, instead, have ratified this unconstitu-
tional and unfair practice to threaten enhancement and coerce a guilty
plea.12 In so doing, they have sponsored an unreviewable wave of
wrongful convictions and left untreated another injury to our criminal
justice system. As argued in this Article, some sentencing enhance-
ments impinge the defendant’s constitutional rights and taint the crim-
inal justice process from plea negotiations through inevitable wrongful
convictions that follow.
Part II of this Article will discuss the Supreme Court’s decisions
related to sentencing enhancements and the evolution that led to the
government proving enhancements at trial. Part III will discuss how
the Supreme Court’s classifications for sentencing enhancements are
inadequate post-Booker, and further classification is needed based
upon the enhancement evidence’s relation to the government’s evi-
dence to prove the underlying crime. Motive evidence is discussed as
central to the analysis and proposal here. Part IV will lay out the con-
stitutional and evidentiary challenges to requiring the government to
prove a sentencing enhancement at an unbifurcated trial. The Article
will present the constitutional arguments against evidence of certain
sentencing enhancements: the defendant’s right to trial; presumption
of innocence; analogies to the defendant’s wearing shackles at trial;
and reference to his silence. California’s gang enhancement then illus-
trates how the judiciary can exacerbate the injustice prompted by the
legislature’s procedural failings. Lastly, Part V offers several definitive
recommendations so that the states’ procedural process with respect
to sentencing enhancements may comport with the Court’s intent to
confer greater procedural guarantees to the criminal defendant, not
less.
10. See infra Part IV. The Author uses California’s gang enhancement as an illus-
tration of his arguments in this Article. See, e.g., People v. Hernandez, 94 P.3d 1080,
1084–85, 1088 (Cal. 2004) (demonstrating the appellate court’s strained logic to hold
that evidence that would not ordinarily be part of the government’s case presentation
is somehow admissible in the unbirfurcated trial because of the sentencing
enhancement).
11. Hernandez, 94 P.3d 1080.
12. See id. at 1088. The California appellate court, in a discussion about the trial
court’s denial of the defendant’s request for bifurcation, manipulated the language of
its unfair prejudice provision in California Evidence Code Section 352, similar to Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 403:
Any evidence admitted solely to prove the gang enhancement was not so
minimally probative on the charged offense, and so inflammatory in compar-
ison, that it threatened to sway the jury to convict regardless of defendants’
actual guilt. Accordingly, defendants did not meet their burden “to clearly
establish that there is a substantial danger of prejudice requiring that the
charges be separately tried.”
Id. at 1087 (quoting People v. Bean, 760 P.2d 996, 1007 (Cal. 1988)).
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II. SENTENCING ENHANCEMENTS ON TRIAL
The United States criminal justice system sets forth more crimes
than anyone could have imagined when it evolved from common law
into a criminal code system.13 Like a fast food menu, American penal
codes are teeming with options—and, as to punishment, the prosecu-
tor increasingly may opt to “supersize” the charges as well. Enhanc-
ing, or threatening to enhance, a defendant’s punishment pretrial and
throughout plea discussions has become mainstream practice in crimi-
nal cases.
A sentencing enhancement is a fact or set of circumstances that,
once proved, serves to increase a defendant’s punishment at sentenc-
ing.14 Often the increase in the accused’s sentence is mandatory and
binding on the sentencing court. Generally, modern criminal legisla-
tion includes not only new crimes but punishment additives that apply
to a broader swath of existing crimes.15 These sentencing portions of
criminal legislation aim to reel in judicial discretion at sentencing and
prescribe sentencing outcomes.16 Legislators never intended to
streamline criminal justice and foster even more guilty pleas in a sys-
tem that already boasts more than 90% of cases resolved by pleas.17
13. See George Will, When Everything is a Crime in the United States, JAPAN
TIMES (Apr. 9, 2015), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2015/04/09/commentary/
world-commentary/everything-crime-united-states/#.VfwROEoo5v4 (“There are an
estimated 4,500 federal criminal statutes—and innumerable regulations backed by
criminal penalties that include incarceration. Even if none of these were arcane,
which many are, their sheer number would mean that Americans would not have
clear notice of what behavior is proscribed or prescribed. The presumption of knowl-
edge of the law is refuted by the mere fact that estimates of the number of federal
statutes vary by hundreds.”).
14. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, ENHANCEMENT, SEN-
TENCING FACTOR, OR SPECIFIC FACTUAL ISSUE: TEMPLATE—BIFURCATED TRIAL
(2006), Westlaw CALCRIM 3251.
15. See infra Section IV.E (discussing California’s STEP Act which includes both
new crimes based upon gang activity and the gang enhancement that is the subject of
this Article).
16. See Michael Fisher, Striking a Balance: The Need to Temper Judicial Discretion
Against a Background of Legislative Interest in Federal Sentencing, 46 DUQ. L. REV.
65, 67–70 (2007) (outlining the historical fluctuations of judicial discretion in federal
sentencing theory prior to the era of mandatory guidelines). Prior to 1987, a court
sentenced a defendant convicted of a felony to a term of imprisonment between the
statutory minimum (often no jail time) and maximum for the offense of conviction.
Id.; see infra note 25 and accompanying text. Today, after Booker, the trial court has
returned to a more structured form of that same wide discretion at sentencing. United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 258–63 (2005) (Breyer, J., opinion in part) (explaining
that the Federal Sentencing Act “requires judges to take account of the Guidelines
together with other sentencing goals”).
17. See Bibas, supra note 3.
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A. The Rise of Sentencing Enhancements
Aspiring legislators seeking the enviable “tough-on-crime” badge
enact new criminal laws, hopefully bearing their names.18 Beginning in
the 1990s and continuing into the 2000s, lawmakers, particularly state
lawmakers, began promulgating sentencing enhancement legislation.19
These enhancement statutes, rather than proscribe any new criminal
conduct, may apply to a broad swath of crimes already on the books in
the state penal codes. Thus, in an era of rampant over-criminalization
and prison overcrowding,20 lawmakers continually sponsor legislation
that serves only to ratchet up the punishment for countless existing
crimes.21
Traditionally, legislators promulgated new criminal statutes with
reference only to a maximum punishment, while trial judges imposed
punishment with wide discretion. Wide judicial discretion allows the
sentencing judge to account for unique offense characteristics and the
individual person facing punishment. Unsatisfied with the lack of uni-
formity and proportionality of criminal sentences, the legislative
branch has increasingly enacted laws aimed at more consistent, pre-
scribed punishment.22 Sentencing enhancement legislation was born
out of the long-standing struggle between the legislative and judicial
18. Renata E.B. Strause, How Federal Statutes Are Named, 105 L. LIBR. J. 7, 10 &
n.17 (2013).
19. See Traci Schlesinger, The Failure of Race Neutral Policies: How Mandatory
Terms and Sentencing Enhancements Contribute to Mass Racialized Incarceration, 57
CRIME & DELINQ. 56, 65 (2011) (“Although there were very few sentencing enhance-
ments or mandatory terms on the books in these five states in 1977, states adopted
dozens of these policies during the period studied. By 2001, the five states in this study
had adopted an average of 20 enhancements or mandatory terms that apply to all
offenses, 51 enhancements or mandatory terms that apply to violent offenses, 9 en-
hancements or mandatory terms that apply to property offenses, and 25 enhance-
ments or mandatory terms that apply to drug offenses.”).
20. See Jim Liske, The 50-Billion-Dollar Question, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 18,
2014, 7:19 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jim-liske/prison-reform-crime_b_51
74435.html [http://perma.cc/QVS6-VLW2] (advancing the economic argument against
prison over-crowding).
21. See Wes R. Porter, Blame Congress, Not Prosecutors, for the Absurdity of
Mandatory Minimums, DAILY J. (Dec. 19, 2013), http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1610&context=pubs [http://perma.cc/PL7N-9JV6] (argu-
ing that federal prosecutors merely play on the field that Congress built with its inevi-
table “tough-on-crime” campaign platform).
22. In 2014 and 2015, much has been written about mandatory minimum
sentences and curbing mandatory punishment for certain, non-violent crimes. In an
argument that echoes some of those posed in this Article, one commentator urged
that Congress can end this injustice:
To achieve this, Congress first needs to stop passing laws that contain
mandatory sentencing provisions. Mandatory sentences do not work . . . .
Prosecutors too often wield enhancements to pressure defendants to plead
rather than exercise their constitutional right to go to trial—or to punish
those that do. . . .
Second, Congress needs to eliminate, or greatly reduce, existing
mandatory minimums . . . .
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branch over the power to control outcomes in criminal cases.23 Like
mandatory minimum sentences24 and guideline sentencing,25 the legis-
lative branch sought, and continues to seek, to control sentencing out-
comes in criminal cases.26
The power struggle to control sentencing outcomes in the 1980s
meant chartering new waters for lawmakers. Before guideline sen-
tencing and mandatory minimum statutes, politicians merely enacted
sentencing platitudes and broad policy statements about the goals of
punishment and the judiciary’s role at sentencing.27 Crime bills may
have contained maximum punishments for newly created crimes, but
sentencing outcomes for criminal defendants used to be properly re-
served for the judiciary.28 The entire federal guideline sentencing
scheme derived from Congress’s creation of the United States Sen-
tencing Commission to oversee and report on federal sentencing.29
After the 2000s, lawmakers regularly promulgated legislation aimed
to curb judicial discretion.30 They sought control over the weight the
court should assign to certain information and, ultimately, the punish-
ment imposed. Even when lawmakers go too far in the tug-of-war
against the judiciary, legislation introduced to peel back oversteps
have little support with politicians.31 Sentencing enhancement legisla-
U.S. Rep. John Conyers, Criminal Injustice, HUFFINGTON POST (May 21, 2014, 12:11
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-conyers/criminal-injustice-justice-reform_b
_5365392.html [http://perma.cc/LFC6-UR25].
23. See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
24. See Robert P. Mosteller, New Dimensions in Sentencing Reform in the Twenty-
First Century, 82 OR. L. REV. 1, 17 (2003) (“Another form of structured sentencing is
the mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment to be imposed upon conviction
for specified crimes or combinations of crimes.”); see also FEDERAL MANDATORY
MINIMUM SENTENCES PASSED, EXPANDED, OR INCREASED BY CONGRESS, 2002–2012,
FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS (Aug. 6, 2012), http://www.famm.org/
Repository/Files/Chart%20Fed%20MMs%20passed%2002-12%208.6.12.pdf [http://
perma.cc/7SHZ-246H] (summarizing a decade of federal mandatory-minimum
legislation).
25. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
(1989)) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.]. The “era” of the mandatory Guidelines is defined as
November 1, 1987, the date the Guidelines became “effective,” to January 12, 2005,
the date of the Court’s Booker decision. Id. ch. 1, pt. A, § 2; United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220, 220 (2005).
26. See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text.
27. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012). If the Guidelines were meant to represent a
skilled attempt of the Commission to balance the § 3553(a) factors in different situa-
tions then, with the numbers and calculations, that attempt falls short. See Wes Reber
Porter, Federal Judges Need Competing Information to Rival Misleading Guidelines at
Sentencing, 26 FED. SENT’G REPORTER 28, 32 (2013), 2013 WL 8171736.
28. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 217(a), 98
Stat. 1837, 2017–26 (1984) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–998).
29. U.S.S.G., supra note 25, at ch. 1, pt. A, § 1–2; see also sources cited supra note
27.
30. See sources cited infra note 31.
31. See Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2155 (2013); see Sixth Amend-
ment—Right to Jury Trial—Mandatory Minimum Sentences—Alleyne v. United
States, 127 HARV. L. REV. 248, 257 (2013) (“Nevertheless, Alleyne represents a signif-
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tion might represent the worst of it. Sentencing enhancements demon-
strate an excellent example of campaign posturing devolving into
more “one-size-fits-all” justice.32
B. How Sentencing Enhancements Are Supposed to Work
Legislators sold sentencing enhancements on the ideals of long-
standing punishment goals of uniformity and proportionality.33 En-
hancement statutes were supposed to assign relative value and weight
to certain information at sentencing to achieve these goals. For the
sake of uniformity, legislatures randomly assigned unsupported value
and weight to specific information for the court. Sentencing enhance-
ment legislation was intended to assist the judiciary and guide the
courts’ discretion at sentencing. Instead of an effective tool for trial
courts, however, enhancements function more as handcuffs or a
straight jacket.
Inherent to judicial discretion at sentencing was the court’s freedom
to consider and weigh voluminous information in fashioning punish-
ment in a criminal case.34 Sentencing processes have long provided the
trial court with information far beyond the contours of the offense
conduct.35 A trial court has long received significant information
icant development in the tug-of-war between the judiciary and the legislature over
control of the sentencing process: it is thus the next major chapter in the rollback of
structured sentencing reforms and legislative authority over sentencing factors that
began in Apprendi.”).
32. Courts often discussed “one-size-fits-all” when considering downward depar-
tures under Guidelines section 5K2.0, “Grounds for Departure,” because the Guide-
lines provision was too sweeping in the case at issue. See, e.g., United States v.
Marquez-Gallegos, 217 F.3d 1267, 1270–71 (10th Cir. 2000) (“Where the factor in
issue is one already taken into account by the applicable Guideline and adjustments,
departure from the Guideline is permissible only if that factor is present in a manner
or degree unusual enough to distinguish the case from the ‘heartland’ of cases covered
by the Guideline.” (citing U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 (1999))); see also United States v. Rausch,
570 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1305 (D. Colo. 2008) (“The criteria also point to individuated
considerations: No one size fits all. The object of this balancing process is to achieve
not a perfect or a mechanical sentence, but a condign one—one that is decent, appro-
priate and deserved under all attendant circumstances.” (emphasis added)).
33. See JACK M. KRESS, PRESCRIPTION FOR JUSTICE 10 (1980); see also Michael M.
O’Hear, The Original Intent of Uniformity in Federal Sentencing, 74 U. CIN. L. REV.
749, 785 (2006) (“Rising departure rates [from the Commission’s mandates] can thus
fairly be characterized as an indication that many judges lack a strong commitment to
the guidelines’ vision of uniformity.” (alteration in original)); William W. Wilkins, Jr.
& John R. Steer, The Role of Sentencing Guideline Amendments in Reducing Unwar-
ranted Sentencing Disparity, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 63, 70 (1993) (“[T]he SRA
seeks to reconcile competing goals of proportionality and uniformity.”).
34. In the federal system, the arm of the court charged with assisting with sentenc-
ing is U.S. Probation, and that office prepares a Presentence Report (“PSR”) about
the defendant and his offense conduct. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 342–45
(2007). Most states have equivalent information before the trial court in preparation
for sentencing. See id.
35. In the federal system, the sentencing court receives a PSR with a wealth of
information about the defendant and his offense conduct. Id. The Supreme Court has
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about the defendant, his offense conduct, and his criminal history.36
Most trial courts, accordingly, consider almost everything related to
the offense and defendant in fashioning the appropriate sentence in a
criminal case.37 Many courts offer detailed reasons for imposing a sen-
tence in a criminal case.
It is important to correct a common misconception about sentenc-
ing enhancements: enhancements do not furnish the sentencing court
with new information. Because the information is already known to
the trial court at sentencing,38 sentencing enhancements do nothing to
better inform the trial court in exercising its discretion.
Sentencing enhancements did prove useful in two contexts. First,
certain information can be too unwieldy and voluminous for the trial
court to sift through and weigh in each individual case. For example,
guidance and valuation of the defendant’s criminal history and a pat-
tern of similar offense conduct can serve the goals of uniformity and
proportionality.39 Sentencing courts should readily appreciate how
other courts have dealt with similar offenders with similar criminal
backgrounds. That is, specific deterrence of the defendant and recidi-
vism generally can be difficult to assess and weigh similarly without
unifying standards.
Second, some sentencing enhancements compel the trial court to
consider information beyond that which was needed to prove the
crime but was nevertheless an obvious part of the case presentation.40
detailed the considerations for the trial judge and reinforces that the § 3553 factors
also mandate “the sentencing judge to ‘impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater
than necessary, to comply with’ the basic aims of sentencing as set out above.” Id. at
347–48.
36. Id. at 342–44.
37. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012). The § 3553 factors represent the provision that
tells the sentencing judge to consider (1) offense and offender characteristics; (2) the
need for a sentence to reflect the basic aims of sentencing, namely, (a) “just punish-
ment” (retribution), (b) deterrence, (c) incapacitation, (d) rehabilitation; (3) the
sentences legally available; (4) the Sentencing Guidelines; (5) Sentencing Commission
policy statements; (6) the need to avoid unwarranted disparities; and (7) the need for
restitution. Id.
38. See Steve Y. Koh, Note, Reestablishing the Federal Judge’s Role in Sentencing,
101 YALE L.J. 1109, 1120–21 (1992) (discussing the prosecutorial gamesmanship in-
herent in gathering information for the court’s consideration at sentencing and in U.S.
Probation’s presentencing reports).
39. The Supreme Court early on excepted out sentencing enhancement provisions
related to criminal history. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 244
(1998) (holding that the fact of a defendant’s prior convictions is not subject to the
jury-trial requirement of the Sixth Amendment); see also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466, 490 (2000). The Court held that the Constitution requires that any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, other
than the fact of a prior conviction, must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. See id. First, the defendant had his day in court with respect to the
prior offenses. Second, the Author believes, criminal history provisions greater serve
the sentencing goals of uniformity and proportionality.
40. Elements of the crime are different from sentencing enhancements. Many
comprehensive crime bills contain both new crimes and sentencing enhancements.
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The sentencing court then effectively weighs statutorily-isolated infor-
mation during sentencing, as compared to a similar defendant con-
victed of a similar crime without these additional offense
characteristics. The range of punishment may shift upward based upon
a finding of these other facts or circumstances. For example, aside
from the defendant’s criminal history and beyond the elements of the
offense, a trial court may consider his use of a weapon, the monetary
impact, or a resulting injury as traditional sentencing enhancements.41
Note here that these enhancements are likely inextricably intertwined
with the government’s natural presentation of its case in chief.42 The
information—the use of a weapon, loss amount, or resulting injury—
likely was part of the trial or guilty plea colloquy and then summa-
rized for the court in a presentence report.
Lastly, it bears stating that the legislative intent of sentencing en-
hancement legislation was never to fundamentally affect the defen-
dant’s constitutional rights, his trial on the underlying offense, or plea
negotiations.43 Sentencing enhancement legislation was supposed to
be reserved for the judge and her sentencing determination post-trial.
Sentencing enhancements were to come into play in the court’s prepa-
ration for a sentencing hearing weeks or months after a defendant’s
conviction at trial or guilty plea.44 They were intended to merely im-
pact how the sentencing judge would weigh the information at sen-
tencing. Unfortunately, not all sentencing enhancements played out as
intended in practice.
With sentencing enhancements, a prosecutor first proves a crime to a jury and beyond
a reasonable doubt and then ratchets up the punishment through additional facts and
factors not proven at trial. Even if presented at trial, when the enhancement is based
upon a fact or factor that is not an element, then a guilty verdict provided no informa-
tion about that fact or factor. Without a special verdict form and a specific request for
the jury to consider it, elements and sentencing factors were segregated by their
phases of trial.
41. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12022.5–.7 (West 2012).
42. See infra Part IV.D. (discussing the evidentiary challenges to motive-based en-
hancements such as improper character, relevance and unfair prejudice).
43. See infra Part III.C. (arguing that certain sentencing enhancements—termed
here as “motive enhancements”—violate the defendant’s constitutional rights to due
process and a fair trial and rob him of his presumption of innocence).
44. See e.g., U.S.S.G., supra note 26, at ch. 1, pt. A (setting forth the “statutory
mission” and “basic approach” policy statements that begin the Guidelines); 18
U.S.C. 3553(a) (2012) (setting out the statutory policies of sentencing). “The Sentenc-
ing Reform Act of 1984 (Title II of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984)
provides for the development of guidelines that will further the basic purposes of
criminal punishment: deterrence, incapacitation, just punishment, and rehabilitation.”
U.S.S.G., supra note 26, at ch. 1, pt. A (“Statutory Mission”). These matters are sim-
ply not relevant at the trial, only for sentencing.
Sentencing legislation, including the most comprehensive attempt promulgated in
the Guidelines, target the goals of honesty, uniformity, and proportionality at sen-
tencing. As argued in this Article, the broad goals of sentencing should never infect
the processes of trial and plea bargaining nor affect the basic constitutional rights of
the accused.
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C. The Court Sought to Confer Benefits to the Accused
at Sentencing
The Supreme Court has long wrestled with sentencing enhance-
ments and the procedural guarantees afforded to the criminal defen-
dant.45 The Court revisited several times the procedural requirements
for proving and applying sentencing enhancements in the federal sys-
tem, as set forth in the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“the
Guidelines”) and similar mandatory state sentencing schemes.46 Since
the inception of sentencing enhancement legislation, criminal defend-
ants have regularly challenged the Court’s increased sentence that re-
sulted from additional factors beyond the elements of the crime and
not proven at trial by the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt. And
the Court has consistently sought to ensure additional procedural
guarantees for the criminally accused.
With each case leading to the Court’s Booker decision in 2005, the
Court profiled an injustice related to sentencing enhancement legisla-
tion as applied in practice.47 The Court initially focused on the notions
of fairness and notice to the accused with the government’s intent to
rely upon a sentencing enhancement after the guilty plea or trial ver-
dict.48 Trial judges had increased a defendant’s exposure at sentencing
through judicial findings that rubber-stamped government allegations
by lower standards of proof such as preponderance of the evidence.49
The Court honed in on the defendant’s constitutional right to jury trial
45. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 84–86 (1986) (holding that a State
may properly treat visible possession of a firearm as a sentencing consideration rather
than an element of a particular offense that must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 207, 214–15 (1977) (rejecting a claim
that, whenever a State links the “severity of punishment” to the “presence or absence
of an identified fact” the State must prove that fact beyond a reasonable doubt).
46. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490–92 (2000); Jones v. United
States, 526 U.S. 227, 242 (1999) (discussing the Sixth Amendment concerns raised in
McMillan as it “broached the potential constitutional significance of fact finding that
raised the sentencing ceiling”); Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 228
(1998).
47. See generally Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 563 (2002) (“Any ‘fact that
. . . exposes the criminal defendant to a penalty exceeding the maximum he would
receive if punished according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone’ . . . would
have been, under the prevailing historical practice, an element of an aggravated of-
fense.”); Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466 (distinguishing sentencing factors that would push
out the maximum punishment of the charged offense); Jones, 526 U.S. at 232 (distin-
guishing between elements to be proved at trial and sentencing factors which could be
first addressed at trial); Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 228 (relegating criminal his-
tory enhancements and recidivism penalties to sentencing); see also McMillan, 477
U.S. at 81 (using “sentencing factor” to refer to a fact that was not found by the jury
but could affect the sentence imposed by the judge).
48. See Jones, 526 U.S. at 249.
49. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (Washington state sentencing
scheme allowing the trial judge to enhance a defendant’s sentencing based upon a
finding by preponderance of the evidence); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220
(2005) (similar requirements in the federal scheme).
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and due process before the enhancement’s application at sentencing.50
The Court consistently questioned sentencing considerations that ma-
terially altered the complexion of the underlying criminal case. The
Court analyzed the accused’s ability to challenge the facts or circum-
stances that led to the increased punishment at sentencing.51
The Court’s 2000 decision in Apprendi was representative of its pro-
tection of the defendant’s individual rights and meaningful procedural
safeguards.52 Before Booker, because most enhancements did not af-
fect maximum punishment and, thus, did not implicate Apprendi, trial
judges still largely considered sentencing enhancements only at the
time of sentencing.53 Sentencing processes, like the federal criminal
justice system, allowed the trial judge to make findings with respect to
the mandatory enhancements to a defendant’s punishment, not only
post-trial at a sentencing hearing, but also by a lesser standard of
proof. Enhancements still lacked procedure and represented a dispro-
portionate focus on statutorily isolated facts and circumstances.
In 2005, the Supreme Court again sought to confer additional pro-
cedural safeguards to criminal defendants by compelling the govern-
ment to prove even more sentencing enhancements to a jury at trial
and by the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt.54 The Court’s deci-
sion effectively treated sentencing enhancements as elements of the
offense based upon the defendant’s constitutional right to jury trial,
50. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 244. In Apprendi, the Court held that the Constitution
requires that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a
jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 474–97 (em-
phasis added).
51. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 274–80 (explaining the bizarre result as founded in the
accused’s right to a jury trial and a beyond a reasonable doubt verdict supporting an
imposed enhancement).
52. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 466, 491–92. The defendant’s understanding of the maxi-
mum punishment available to the court at sentencing is fundamental to fairness and
notice. Lawmakers set forth maximum punishment in criminal statutes and trial
courts must apprise defendant of his exposure at the time of arraignment and again at
a guilty plea. In federal and state criminal courts, defendants had opted to plead guilty
or contest government allegations at trial without adequate knowledge or notice that
his sentence could be enhanced thereafter and the maximum punishment upon con-
viction could slide upward. The Apprendi Court held that, if the sentencing enhance-
ment increases the maximum punishment, then it must prove such an enhancement at
trial, as if it were an element. Id. at 477, 490. In many states thereafter, prosecutors
therefore must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, and the jury must specifically find,
any enhancement that pushed out the ceiling of his maximum punishment. See id. at
495–97.
53. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022(b)(1) (West 2012) (“A person who per-
sonally uses a deadly or dangerous weapon in the commission of a felony or at-
tempted felony shall be punished by an additional and consecutive term of
imprisonment in the state prison for one year.” (emphasis added)). For serious, under-
lying offenses such as robbery, burglary, and rape, a one year enhancement to a de-
fendant’s sentence would likely not affect the twenty-year or more statutory
maximum punishments proscribed in the California Penal Code.
54. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005) (Stevens, J., opinion in part).
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his right to a fair trial.55 The Booker Court required a jury trial and
proof beyond a reasonable doubt for any factor that would mandate
an increase in a defendant’s sentence regardless of the impact on the
accused’s maximum exposure.56 No one predicted the gift horse the
Booker decision would become in the decade that followed.
As argued in this Article, after Booker, the process for imposing a
sentencing enhancement more severely impacted some defendants by
depriving them of the very constitutional rights the Court sought to
protect—the accused’s right to jury trial and due process under the
law. The miscarriage of justice discussed below surfaced in the states
where again state legislators erroneously believed that they were of-
fering greater protections to the criminal defendant. The Booker
Court provided for two solutions: the federal solution of “structured
discretionary sentencing” and the solution opted for by some states—
a jury trial on all sentencing enhancements. It is the latter solution
adopted by some states, including California, that poses the dangers
discussed in this Article: coercive plea discussions, deprived constitu-
tional rights, and avoidable wrongful convictions.
D. The Federal Solution
For almost twenty years, the federal criminal justice system allowed
sentencing to dominate the discussion.57 The federal sentencing guide-
lines were binding on the sentencing judge.58 The parties briefed up-
ward and downward movement to the applicable guideline range, to
include enhancements, departures, and variances predominantly re-
lated to the defendant’s offense conduct. After a guilty plea or guilty
verdict at trial, the trial court made determinations about this move-
ment of the applicable sentencing range using the preponderance of
the evidence standard.59 Most sentencing determinations were well-
55. Id. at 241–42.
56. Id. at 244.
57. See supra text accompanying note 25.
58. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2012), excised by United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220 (2005); see also Report on the Continuing Impact of United States v. Booker
on Federal Sentencing, UNITED STATES SENT’G COMMISSION 14 (2012), http://
www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/booker
-reports/2012-booker/Part_A.pdf [http://perma.cc/N85J-Q29F] (“For nearly twenty
years, courts were required to impose sentences within the applicable guideline range
unless the court found the existence of an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a
kind or to a degree not adequately taken into consideration by the Commission in
formulating the sentencing guidelines.” (emphasis added)) [hereinafter “Booker
Report”].
59. Id. The trial court’s determinations at sentencing served the overarching goals
of the Sentencing Reform Act and the Guidelines—honesty, uniformity, and propor-
tionality. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2010); U.S.S.G., supra note 26, at ch. 1, § 1.3
(Congress set out three goals in the preamble to the Guidelines: (1) “honesty in sen-
tencing”; (2) “uniformity in sentencing by narrowing the wide disparity in sentences
imposed for similar criminal offenses committed by similar offenders”; and (3) “pro-
portionality in sentencing through a system that imposes appropriately different
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prescribed while others were vaguer and susceptible to argument. In
the end, after the court findings, the district judge’s discretion in sen-
tencing was narrowly confined to a tight range of months of
imprisonment.
The Booker decision dramatically changed the landscape of federal
sentencing.60 The decision could have been devastating to the federal
criminal justice system, the U.S. Sentencing Commission and Guide-
lines, and nearly two decades of sentencing jurisprudence between
1988 and 2005. But the Court sidestepped the destruction and con-
jured a solution to preserve the Guidelines and the long-standing fed-
eral sentencing schema: The Court offered that, if the Guidelines were
discretionary, not mandatory, then the Guidelines remained constitu-
tional.61 The federal solution, consistent with the court’s intent,62 aims
to protect the accused and his constitutional rights.63
More importantly, criminal defendants have benefited from the
post-Booker application of the discretionary Guidelines in the federal
system. Criminal defendants have received increasingly lower
sentences each year as the system drifts away from the mandatory
guidelines era of 1988–2005.64 And when convicted of crimes for
which the mandatory guidelines were most harsh, such as drug traf-
ficking crimes, with many federal offenses, the accused now receive a
sentences for criminal conduct of differing severity.”); cf. Gall v. United States, 522
U.S. 39, 49–50 (2007) (returning the federal district courts to a three-step process
post-Booker, requiring the court to: consult the Guidelines as advisory to the ultimate
sentence imposed; consider departures and adjustments; and consider the policy and
factors of § 3553(a)).
60. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 226–27 (Stevens, J., opinion in part). To remedy this
unconstitutionality, Booker rendered the Guidelines advisory. See id. at 245 (Breyer,
J., opinion in part). Because advisory guidelines permit a judge to “exercise[ ] his
discretion to select a specific sentence within a defined range,” they do “not implicate
the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 233 (Stevens, J., opinion in part).
61. Id. True to the Court’s central holding in Booker, the accused no longer is
subject to mandatory increases to his sentence based upon factors neither alleged nor
proven at trial. See id. at 244. Because the ultimate sentence is a discretionary applica-
tion by a court, the rigidity of enhancements and specific information do not domi-
nate the narrative. See id. at 233 Instead, the sentencing judge considers more about
individuals and individual circumstances than enhancements and calculations.
62. Critics of the federal sentencing scheme, including the federal solution post-
Booker, argue that Guidelines remain overly formulaic and the trial court continues
to rubber-stamp findings set forth by the prosecutors by the lower standard of proof
of preponderance of the evidence. Erik Luna, Gridland: An Allegorical Critique of
Federal Sentencing, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 25, 39, 60–62 (2005).
63. The Court then offered that the Guidelines could pass constitutional muster if
they were not binding on the sentencing judge. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 245 (Breyer,
J., opinion in part). The Court even set out a process whereby the Guidelines re-
mained central to the framework for the Court’s restored discretion at sentencing. Id.
After Booker, the judge must consider the Guidelines, make findings about sentenc-
ing enhancements by preponderance of the evidence (for sentences exceeding the
maximum), and then use its discretion to sentence within the punishments allowed
under the statutes. Id. at 233, 244–45.
64. Booker Report, supra note 58, at 24–25, 58.
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markedly lower sentence as compared to the applicable guideline
range, and the Court imposes a “below-guideline” sentence in a
higher percentage of cases.65
Some states followed the federal solution. Other states opted for a
jury trial on the sentencing enhancement alleged by the government,
complete with jury findings on the enhancements by the standard of
beyond a reasonable doubt—what this Article calls “the states’ solu-
tion.”66 Yet, even in the states that opted for the states’ solution, many
enhancements do not pose the dangers discussed in this Article.67 The
pressing problem lies with an undeclared classification of sentencing
enhancements in these states opting for the states’ solution, those that
did not follow the federal solution. To narrow the analysis and shed
light on this latent problem, this Article isolates a new classification of
enhancements not considered yet by the judiciary.
III. A NEW SENTENCING ENHANCEMENT CLASSIFICATION
AND MOTIVE EVIDENCE
To date, the Court has classified sentencing enhancements largely
based upon the effect a specific enhancement has on the defendants’
potential or imposed sentence.68 The Court’s outcome-based classifi-
cations of sentencing enhancements proved effective before 2005 and
its decision in United States v. Booker.69 There was simply no need to
classify or treat differently other sentencing enhancements.70 These
outcome-based classifications worked pre-Booker because other en-
hancements were relegated to the discretion of the trial judge at the
sentencing hearing.
A. Classifying an Enhancement by its Relation to the
Underlying Crime
I propose, in the wake of Booker and because of the states’ solution
that the judiciary also must consider, and eventually classify, a sen-
tencing enhancement based upon its relation to the government’s evi-
65. Id. at 3, 58–61. For example, from 2005 to 2011, the percentage difference from
the low end of the applicable guideline and the sentence imposed has widened from a
low of 10.2% below the guideline minimum in fiscal year 2004 to a high of 17.9%
below the guideline minimum in fiscal year 2011. Id. at 61.
66. It is important to note that the “states’ solution” bears the most logical con-
nection to the holding in Booker. The Author and other scholars posit that the federal
solution was unnecessary to the Booker holding, incongruous and specially crafted for
diplomatic and other reasons.
67. For example, enhancements related to the defendant’s prior criminal history
remained properly reserved for sentencing and enhancement evidence that is inextri-
cably intertwined with the government case presentation in its case-in-chief are al-
ready before the jury.
68. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 229 (1998).
69. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
70. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 229–30.
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dence presented on the underlying offense conduct. In light of the
coercive plea negotiation practices and resulting wrongful convictions,
we must treat these most problematic sentencing enhancements in a
dramatically new way. To greater assist legislators, trial courts, and
appellate courts, we must independently consider a new classification
based upon the connection, even direct overlap, between the evidence
supporting the offense conduct alleged and the evidence supporting a
jury’s finding on the sentencing enhancement.
1. Inextricably Intertwined
Here, the term “inextricably intertwined,” borrowed from evidence
rules and jurisprudence, is useful.71 When there is direct overlap be-
tween the evidence the government will present at trial on the ele-
ments of underlying crimes and the evidence, then the two are
inextricably intertwined. A shorter version is, would the jury have
heard this evidence even without the sentencing enhancement? If yes,
then the jury’s consideration of the sentencing enhancement at the
same trial before the same jury does not suffer from the constitutional
and evidentiary pitfalls discussed in this Article.
For example, consider the use of a weapon, amount of financial loss,
and resulting injury types of enhancements under the states’ solution.
Even if not directly supporting an element of an assault or fraud
charge, we fully expect evidence of these type of enhancements to be
presented at trial because they are inextricably intertwined with the
government’s presentation of its case in chief. Stated differently, we
expect that the evidence at issue would be part of the government’s
presentation whether or not the case involved a sentencing enhance-
ment. As another example of an intertwined enhancement, many
states have a “gun enhancement” for specific crimes committed with
firearms.72 Distinct from the many firearm offenses in the penal codes
in every jurisdiction, the gun enhancement increases the punishment
for crimes that do not reflect anything about the firearm in the ele-
ments of the crime, such as robbery, threat, and assault crimes.
Through the course of proving the robbery, threat, or assault case, the
prosecutor would present credible evidence of the defendant’s use of
a gun, whether or not the sentence increased based upon the gun.
71. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b); United States v. Vizcarra-Martinez, 66 F.3d 1006,
1012–13 (9th Cir. 1995).
72. Adam Ferrise, Akron Man Sentenced to 13 Years in Wife’s Killing, NE. OHIO
MEDIA GROUP (Apr. 10, 2015, 1:18 PM), http://www.cleveland.com/akron/index.ssf/20
15/04/world_war_ii_veteran_sentenced.html [http://perma.cc/2K2P-BCA8] (describ-
ing a case where the defendant was convicted and sentenced to thirteen years for
involuntary manslaughter based upon shooting his wife).
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2. Motive Enhancements
Conversely, evidence in support of a sentencing enhancement that
would not otherwise organically be part of the government’s case-in-
chief should be treated differently by the trial court during the proce-
dural consideration of bifurcation. The evidence in support of the en-
hancement that is new and different should not be presented to the
same jury at the same time as they consider guilt on the underlying
crimes. For instance, evidence supporting sentencing enhancements
that relate to the defendant’s motive to commit the crime are not nec-
essarily inextricably intertwined with the evidence we expect in sup-
port of the underlying criminal allegations.73 We will use the term
“motive enhancements” to describe this category in this Article.
To ensure that a defendant’s constitutional rights are protected and
that the integrity of his criminal justice system is preserved, it is time
to rethink sentencing enhancements premised on the defendant’s
criminally culpable motive to commit the crime. We must isolate these
motive enhancements to ensure that defendants’ constitutional rights
to a trial and due process are protected. The Court, as discussed
above, has analyzed sentencing enhancements before with an eye to-
ward protecting an accused’s constitutional rights and creating proce-
dural safeguards in our criminal justice system.74
3. Mandatory Bifurcation
Under the states’ solution, the most applicable procedural safe-
guard is mandatory bifurcation. Most American court systems offer
bifurcated trials and bifurcated phases of trial75 as a procedural tool
available to the trial judge at her discretion. In most instances, when
the legislative branch needs untainted jury findings then they pre-
scribe mandatory bifurcation in the statute or the appellate courts de-
cide that tool must be used in specific circumstances.76 Mandatory or
statutory bifurcation, as opposed to mere discretionary tools, has
73. Vizcarra-Martinez, 66 F.3d at 1012–13, 1015–16.
74. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 226–27; see also supra notes 46–60.
75. For purposes of this Article, “bifurcated trial” indicates two distinct juries who
consider separate issues framed by the court and “bifurcated phases of trial,” the
more prevalent procedural tool in this context, refers to the same jury considering
separate issues in seriatim and benefitting from evidence heard during earlier phases.
76. See, e.g., California Penal Code section 1026 requires bifurcation when the
criminal defendant provides notice of his intent to advance the insanity defense in
California. Similarly, California Penal Code section 190.1 provides for mandatory bi-
furcation for death penalty cases in California. In the federal context, Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 32.2 mandates that the court determine the property subject to
civil forfeiture in a separate phase of trial, typically with the same jury, following a
guilty verdict on counts connected to proceeds of the crime. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.2.
Even the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure offer bifurcation “for convenience, to
avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize.” FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b). The federal
court presiding over a civil trial “may order a separate trial of one or more separate
issues, claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, or third-party claims.” Id.
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worked well elsewhere in criminal cases such as death penalty cases,
insanity defenses,77 and even asset forfeiture claims that accompany
criminal charges.78
No court has found a constitutional right to bifurcation.79 The judi-
ciary employs discretionary bifurcation of issues, such as liability and
damages, as well as severance of parties, such as indemnification
claims, routinely in civil cases.80 The accused has the burden to estab-
lish the need for bifurcation.81 The defendant the Supreme Court
sought to protect in Booker and its progeny, most commonly the party
seeking bifurcation of evidence supporting a motive enhancement
from other evidence supporting the underlying charge, has the burden
to “clearly establish that there is a substantial danger of prejudice re-
quiring that the charges be separately tried.”82 Unfortunately, trial
77. The defendant’s insanity defense makes the strongest case for mandatory bi-
furcation for motive enhancements. The defendant’s presentation about his lack of
intent at the same time and at the same trial as his evidence of his own disease or
defect that may excuse his criminal conduct can muck up the government’s case. So,
several state legislators have cured a procedural problem for the government. Cur-
rently, twelve jurisdictions provide for bifurcation for insanity defenses by statute or
court rule. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE COURT
ORGANIZATION, 2004 199–202 (2006), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/sco04.pdf
[http://perma.cc/5SRT-PRAS]. In some of those states, bifurcation is mandatory and
not left to the discretion of the trial judge. See Kathryn S. Berthot, Bifurcation in
Insanity Trials: A Change in Maryland’s Criminal Procedure, 48 MD. L. REV. 1045,
1053 (1989).
By deduction, when it favors the government, lawmakers figure out how to parse
out the phases of trial between guilt phase and potential defense. When it adversely
affects the criminal defendant, the legislators fail to parse out trial from sentencing
matters to protect the constitutional rights of the accused.
78. See United States v. Feldman, 853 F.2d 648, 662 (9th Cir. 1988). The bifurca-
tion phase of an asset forfeiture allegation also favors the government’s presentation
of criminal and civil cases with different burdens. See id. at 662–63. Like a segregated
sentencing phase of trial as to applicable enhancements, the asset forfeiture phase of a
criminal case can require only limited additional work after the guilt phase before the
same jury. Id. Slightly different evidence that serves a slightly different purpose in the
criminal justice process. Id.
By deduction again, when it favors the government, lawmakers figure out how to
parse out the phases of trial between civil and criminal and guilt versus asset
forfeiture.
79. Hester v. State, 315 N.E.2d 351, 353 (Ind. 1974); People v. Newberry, 290
N.E.2d 592, 597 (Ill. 1972); Commonwealth v. Bumpus, 290 N.E.2d 167, 175 (Mass.
1972); Simpson v. State, 275 A.2d 794, 795 (Del. 1971). In fact, “[n]o court has yet
accepted the argument that the concept of a bifurcated trial is a constitutional right
that inures to the defendant in any given case.” People v. Yukl, 372 N.Y.S.2d 313, 315
(Sup. Ct. 1975).
80. In the civil context, judges truly see bifurcation, as well as severance, as an
efficiency mechanism because they can save work and the jury’s time by taking up
trial phases one at a time. In criminal cases, the trial judge knows that 90% or more
cases result in conviction and proceed to a sentencing phase. Thus, discretionary bi-
furcation goes underutilized in the criminal context because judges see the tool as
creating two trials out of one.
81. People v. Hernandez, 94 P.3d 1080, 1086 (Cal. 2004) (holding that the defen-
dant did not meet his burden that bifurcation was necessary in these circumstances).
82. Hernandez, 94 P.3d at 1086.
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courts, if given the choice, steer clear of bifurcated trials as a matter of
policy.83 Yet an accused’s constitutional rights can be infringed once
the trial court denies bifurcation.
Some jurisdictions rely upon the lack of statutory authority to dis-
miss motions for bifurcation.84 Others conjure up legislative intent to
conduct a single trial where there was none.85 The technical remedy is
available to the defendant, but, in truth, it represents a failure on be-
half of the lawmakers to provide for procedural safeguards for the
accused. In some circumstances, as with motive enhancements, the ac-
cused’s right to a fair trial and due process under the law can only be
realized through the procedural guarantee of a bifurcated trial.
Because many state criminal courts opted for the states’ solution for
sentencing enhancements, the criminal justice system must develop
further classification to, once again, protect the rights of the accused
and require bifurcation at trial. A brief look at the rationale for how
our criminal justice system handles both death penalty cases and crim-
inal history sentencing enhancements can show the way for motive
enhancements.
B. Supreme Court’s Classifications of Sentencing Enhancements
1. Death Penalty Procedure Lessons
While death is undeniably different because of its severity and irrev-
ocability,86 the states’ implementation of capital punishment schemes,
83. The Arizona Supreme Court found the requirement of bifurcation in its in-
sanity statute created an irrefutable presumption of intent during the first part of the
trial which violated the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial. See State v.
Shaw, 471 P.2d 715, 724 (Ariz. 1970). “Texas’s insanity statute [that] provided for
mandatory bifurcation of the defendant’s mental state was repealed by the state legis-
lature on due process grounds.” Berthot, supra note 77, at 1046 & 1046 n.4 (citing
Townsend v. State, 427 S.W.2d 55, 61–62 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968)). Texas’s anxiety
over mandatory bifurcation was brewing for some time as it earlier denied bifurcation
on the grounds that “[t]wo-part jury trials are rare in our jurisprudence . . . [and] have
never been compelled by this Court as a matter of constitutional law.” Spencer v.
Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 568 (1967). Lastly, a Wyoming court found that the bifurcation
statute prohibited the defendant from presenting evidence against his guilt until the
second phase of the trial—a violation of due process. Sanchez v. State, 567 P.2d 270,
274, 278 (Wyo. 1977).
84. See, e.g., Gruzen v. State, 634 S.W.2d 92, 95 (Ark. 1982) (“[Defendant was] not
entitled to a bifurcated trial . . . [because the] Rules of Criminal Procedure do not
provide for such a trial.”).
85. In State v. Sanders, the Supreme Court of Kansas asserted the separation was
impermissible because “the verdict form . . . contemplate[d] an unbifurcated trial.”
State v. Sanders, 574 P.2d 559, 565 (Kan. 1977); accord State v. Gray, 351 So. 2d 448,
455 (La. 1977) (determining the statute implied the necessity to deny bifurcation).
86. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 468 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (“[B]ecause of its severity and irrevocability, the death penalty
is qualitatively different from any other punishment.”); see also Jeffery Abramson,
Death-is-Different Jurisprudence and the Role of the Capital Jury, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 117, 117 n.1 (2004).
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including its necessary procedural safeguards, informs the sentencing
enhancement discussion. Due to its severity and finality, “there is a
corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determina-
tion that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.”87 The
Court unequivocally rested its constitutional decisions about capital
punishment on heightened procedural safeguards due to the ac-
cused.88 Central among these procedural safeguards was the need for
jury findings at sentencing and bifurcated proceedings of trial and sen-
tencing phases to ensure the underlying trial and finding of guilt is not
tainted.89 It is of some importance that the government and the defen-
dant have an equal interest in an untainted guilt phase of trial.90
A jurisdiction can impose the death penalty, the ultimate sentencing
enhancement available in some murder cases, by way of, first, a jury’s
finding in an underlying “guilt phase” of the murder case and, second,
a separate “penalty phase” finding after weighing aggravating and
mitigating factors of the crime.91 In most jurisdictions, only after an
untainted finding of guilt, the jury must unanimously find that capital
punishment is appropriate. Of the procedural safeguards afforded to
the accused in a capital case, the following three can inform our un-
derstanding of the procedural inadequacies for motive enhancements:
• it is mandated by statute that the jury’s work in a capital case is
bifurcated into two distinct phases;
• the trial on the guilt phase is undisturbed and untainted by the
potential punishment available at sentencing; and
87. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976); see also Ring v. Arizona,
536 U.S. 584, 614 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“This Court has held the Eighth
Amendment requires States to apply special procedural safeguards when they seek
the death penalty.”); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (plurality
opinion) (“When a defendant’s life is at stake, the Court has been particularly sensi-
tive to insure that every safeguard is observed.”).
88. In no uncertain terms, Justice Breyer stated in his concurrence in Ring, with-
out heightened procedural safeguards, the use of the death penalty would violate the
Eighth Amendment. Ring, 536 U.S. at 614 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Otherwise, the
constitutional prohibition against ‘cruel and unusual punishments’ would forbid its
use.”). In Gregg, a plurality specifically enumerated several procedural safeguards to
ward against the arbitrariness and capriciousness of imposing the death penalty at
sentencing. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188–89.
89. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 190–95. The need for jury sentencing was expressed in
Gregg so as “to maintain a link between contemporary community values and the
penal system—a link without which the determination of punishment could hardly
reflect ‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing soci-
ety.’” Id. at 190 (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968)).
90. To be more explicit, the government needs a conviction and, in a capital case,
the prospect of the imposition of the death penalty has the very real possibility of
affecting jurors’ findings on guilt. To preserve the integrity of the murder allegation,
the considerations of punishment are carved out of the guilt phase and reserved for
the sentencing phase. Cynically, the legislature provided for mandatory bifurcation
and procedural safeguards when favorable to the government.
91. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1 (West 2014).
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• after sitting for the trial on the underlying crime, the same jury
then decides whether the increased punishment is warranted
with the benefit of all of the evidence put before it in the earlier
phase.
The Supreme Court long ago acknowledged that the criminal defen-
dant’s constitutional right to a jury trial dictated that a jury, as op-
posed to a judge, must make the necessary findings for imposition of
the death penalty.92 As finders of fact in the death penalty context,
however, the jury must be adequately informed both of evidence rele-
vant to sentencing and of appropriate standards for making a death
penalty decision to satisfy the heightened procedural safeguards.93
The Court recognized early on that mandatory bifurcation was also
necessary.94 After requiring jury sentencing, the Court cited, at length,
the sections of Model Penal Code that discussed the merits of bifurca-
tion as a procedural safeguard against jury prejudice during the guilt
phase.95 “The obvious solution . . . is to bifurcate the proceeding, abid-
ing strictly by the rules of evidence until and unless there is a convic-
tion, but once guilt has been determined opening the record to the
further information that is relevant to sentence.”96 That is, when re-
quiring a jury finding as a procedural protection for the accused, the
Court was mindful that the defendant’s right to a fair trial and other
constitutional rights were not impacted.97 Of the jurisdictions that still
have the death penalty, all of them adhere to jury sentencing and bi-
furcated proceedings.98
The Court further considered the evidentiary implications inherent
when information bearing on sentencing may taint the precedent guilt
determination.99 In the death penalty context, with a jury finding on
92. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609 (majority opinion). In Ring, Justice Breyer suggested
another reason for the necessity of jury sentencing—“retribution provides the main
justification for capital punishment”—and only a jury (presumably because they have
heard the facts and evidence) can determine if the death penalty will serve that pur-
pose. Id. at 614 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504,
515–26 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
93. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189–95.
94. Id. at 190–91.
95. Id. at 191 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.6 cmt 5 (AM. LAW INST., Tena-
tive Draft No. 9, 1959) (“[If a unitary proceeding is used] the determination of the
punishment must be based on less than all the evidence that has a bearing on that
issue . . . . Trial lawyers understandably have little confidence in a solution that admits
the evidence and trusts to an instruction to the jury that it should be considered only
in determining the penalty and disregarded in assessing guilt.”)).
96. Id. (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.6 cmt. 5 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative
Draft No. 9, 1959)).
97. Id. at 190–91.
98. See Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 456 (1983) (“Bifurcated proceedings
are now the rule in capital cases throughout the Nation.”). See generally Capital Pun-
ishment, 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 895, 902–11 (2015) (discussing state
procedures for capital punishment).
99. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 190–91.
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sentencing, state law required mandatory bifurcation because “[m]uch
of the information that is relevant to the sentencing decision may have
no relevance to the question of guilt, or may even be extremely preju-
dicial to a fair determination of that question.”100 Death is different,
and capital punishment jurisprudence more easily commands the
Court’s attention.101 But the same principles dictate the jury trials re-
quired for motive enhancements today.102
2. Criminal History Sentencing Enhancements Lessons
After several years of reviewing broad-based punishment increases
in criminal cases, the Court had to sort through other sentencing en-
hancements, such as those based upon the defendant’s criminal his-
tory.103 The classic theories of punishment are rooted in treating
recidivists more harshly at sentencing.104 The defendant’s recidivism
and specific deterrence have long been a sentencing consideration for
the trial court.105 Some of the earliest sentencing enhancements thus
focused not on the crime but on the criminal’s prior encounters with
criminal justice system.106
100. Id. at 190.
101. See sources cited supra note 86.
102. See, e.g., Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303–04 (2004) (requiring a jury
determination of motive when it would cause sentencing above the statutory maxi-
mum). Why did the Gregg Court so readily recognize the need to bifurcate the guilt
phase with jury sentencing in a capital trial while, almost 30 years later, the Booker
Court did not require jury findings for many sentencing enhancements, avoiding the
need to address bifurcation? See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 190–91; Booker v. United States,
543 U.S. 223, 244, 264–65 (2005). One theory is the government, in capital cases, has a
similar interest in not infecting the guilt phase of a capital case with sentencing evi-
dence because jurors may not find guilt in appropriate cases due to their ideological
or personal feelings about capital punishment. As discussed below, with jury findings
on other sentencing enhancements post-Booker, the government does not run the
same risk of impacting its case on the underlying crime. See infra Section III.C & Part
IV. The evidence supporting a sentencing enhancement generally favors a finding of
guilt and, with the proliferation of sentencing enhancements, prosecutors do not want
to navigate two phases of so many jury trials. See infra Section III.C & Part IV.
103. See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 563 (2002) (“Any ‘fact that . . .
exposes the criminal defendant to a penalty exceeding the maximum he would receive
if punished according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone’ . . . would have
been, under the prevailing historical practice, an element of an aggravated offense.”);
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (same); Jones v. United States, 526 U.S.
227, 232 (1999) (same).
104. See Nancy J. King, Sentencing and Prior Convictions: The Past, the Future, and
the End of the Prior-Conviction Exception to Apprendi, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 523,
526–30 (2014) (discussing the theory and history of the use of recidivism in
sentencing).
105. Id. at 537–50.
106. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 228 (1998) (relegating crim-
inal history enhancements and recidivism penalties to sentencing); see also Spencer v.
Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 565–67 (1967) (discussing common law and statutory approaches
to considering prior convictions in sentencing).
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The Court was quick to reserve consideration for these “criminal
history enhancements” for the judge at sentencing.107 Unlike an ele-
ment of a crime based upon criminal history, such as a felon in posses-
sion of a firearm, the Court was careful not to require a jury finding
for criminal history sentencing enhancements.108 The states
followed.109
The judiciary, like it did with evidence related to death penalty de-
terminations, intuitively segregated evidence of the criminal history
enhancement from the evidence related to the underlying criminal of-
fense. The determination for criminal history enhancements was rele-
gated to a sentencing hearing and for the trial judge.110 The judiciary
had comfort in relegating enhancements based upon the defendant’s
criminal past to sentencing because, as to his constitutional concerns,
those matters had their day in court. The courts could arrive at a pro-
cess with criminal history enhancements that did not offend the ac-
cused constitutional rights to due process and fair trial—he already
had due process and his independent right to trial on the other
charges. For purposes of this Article, the following two reasons are
instructive; how and why the courts decided that criminal history
should not be part of the trial on the underlying crime.
First, the introduction of evidence about a defendant’s criminal his-
tory is antithetical to a fair, impartial, and non-prejudicial trial. Our
criminal justice system is premised on the axiom that a defendant is
tried solely on his offense conduct, not his past conduct and propen-
sity to commit crimes. Status and profiling generally have no place at a
criminal trial. If criminal history were incorporated in the same trial
and before the same jury as the underlying crime, then the defendant
with priors would seldom get a fair and impartial jury trial as to the
underlying offense. The system would always be trying whom the de-
fendant was as opposed to what the defendant allegedly did.
Second, and importantly as discussed below with respect to motive
enhancements, lawmakers promulgated evidence codes and specific
rules of evidence to exclude evidence of the defendant’s other crimes
107. See supra notes 46–60 (defining the rule of sentencing enhancements as “other
than criminal history”).
108. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000) (citing Jones v. United
States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 (1999)).
109. See People v. Calderon, 885 P.2d 83, 89 n.2 (Cal. 1994) (noting the practice of
judicial consideration of prior convictions in sentencing by many states and the fed-
eral government). Under an earlier decision in People v. Bracamonte, a California
court of appeal announced a rule bifurcating all sentencing phases requiring evidence
of challenged prior convictions. People v. Bracamonte, 174 Cal. Rptr. 191, 195–96 (Ct.
App. 1981). The court in Bracamonte asserted that allegations regarding prior convic-
tions were inherently prejudicial to the defendant and, as a result, should be insulated
from the guilt phase by bifurcation; however, in People v. Calderon, the California
Supreme Court altered the rule of Bracamonte and gave greater discretionary power
concerning bifurcation to the judiciary. Id.; Calderon, 885 P.2d at 90–91.
110. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 228.
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and status in most instances. The judiciary recognized long ago that
evidence in support of criminal history enhancements should not be
part of the trial on the underlying charge.111 The potential for taint of
the accused’s right to fair trial and presumption of innocence was
apparent.112
Due to the states’ failure to distinguish different types of enhance-
ments and the inartful procedural implementation under the states’
solution, instead of a safeguard conferred to the accused, prosecutors
gained yet another tactical advantage during plea bargaining and at
trial. Legislators and trial courts failed to consider the procedural im-
plications of proving motive enhancements at trial and the critical
need to protect the accused against spillover in the form of bifurcated
trial provisions. As a result, once the prosecution alleges certain sen-
tencing enhancements, the accused has been procedurally doomed.
C. Motive Evidence
Motive is among the most difficult admissibility calls for criminal
trial courts. Motive evidence involves the questions jurors want an-
swered most, but motive is not an element of most crimes. Motive
evidence makes for difficult admissibility determination for the court
because often what motivated the defendant to commit the crime will
unfairly prejudice him at trial. Motive evidence can incorporate a
larger illicit purpose for committing the crime, often related to finan-
cial incentives, such as gambling debts, drug habits, and gang activity.
While the defendant’s motive is almost always relevant, motive evi-
dence just as often violates character evidence and unfair prejudice
rules. Because character evidence, arguments of other crimes, wrongs,
or acts under Federal Rule 404(b), and the unfair prejudice balancing
test under Rule 403 are so broad, they are evidentiary issues most ripe
for litigation in criminal trials.113
In the federal rules, and most state rules that mirror the language,
the word “motive” appears only in Rule 404(b) describing “crimes,
wrongs or other acts” by the defendant.114 Rule 404(b) is a prosecu-
tor’s rule that allows the admission of other bad acts by the defendant
when probative—not of his propensity to commit crime but of some
other part of the case that is controverted by the defense.115 Some of
the other acceptable uses of other crimes, wrongs, or acts are elements
111. Id.; see also supra notes 102–109.
112. See supra notes 102–109.
113. See FED. R. EVID. 403, 404(b).
114. FED. R. EVID. 404(b); see, e.g., TEX. R. EVID. 404(b).
115. See James DeCleene, A Prosecutor’s Guide to Character Evidence: When is
Uncharged Possession Evidence Probative of a Defendant’s Intent to Distribute?, 98
MARQ. L. REV. 1383, 1383–86 (2015).
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or facts that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
such as identity, knowledge, and intent.116
This Article argues that motive evidence is not inextricably inter-
twined with the government’s presentation of evidence to the underly-
ing crime. If motive is a difficult admissibility determination for trial
judges and involves the two most litigated rules of evidence in crimi-
nal trials, then it cannot be inherently part of the government’s proof
of the underlying crime. Courts do not consistently admit motive evi-
dence in any identifiable way in criminal cases. Instead, courts unpre-
dictably tend to allow motive evidence in more serious crimes or when
the government needs it more to convict. Stated differently, prosecu-
tors do not plan on motive evidence as part of the trial and should not
need it to convict. For prosecutors, motive is frosting on the cake.
Many courts have admitted other crimes evidence under Rule
404(b) to prove motive and, therefore, would disagree with the funda-
mental premise stated above—that evidence of motive enhancements is
not inextricably intertwined with evidence that we expect to be presented
to the jury at trial.117 The judiciary’s disagreement, however, is based
upon flawed logic. Courts make the improper inference that because
motive evidence is often admitted into evidence at criminal trials that
evidence of motive enhancements must be inextricably intertwined as
well. That is, courts mistakenly believe that the evidence would be
before the jury anyway, even without the sentencing enhancement al-
leged. Not true. It has been shown decidedly to be false.118
Much of the evidence in support of a motive enhancement is not pure
motive evidence. Much of it is entirely unforeseeable as part of the
government case presentation and, worse yet, goes far beyond what a
trial court would ever permit under the rules of evidence. For exam-
116. See FED. R. EVID. § 404(b).
117. See e.g., People v. Hernandez, 94 P.3d 1080, 1085–89 (Cal. 2004) (admitting
gang evidence against the defendant “to show a motive for the crime”) (“A prior
conviction allegation relates to the defendant’s status and may have no connection to
the charged offense; by contrast, the criminal street gang enhancement is attached to
the charged offense and is, by definition, inextricably intertwined with that offense. So
less need for bifurcation generally exists with the gang enhancement.” (citing People
v. Martin, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 660 (Ct. App. 1994) (emphasis added)); see also People v.
Mendoza, 6 P.3d 150 (Cal. 2000) (element of fear); People v. Williams, 940 P.2d 710
(1997) (motive and identity).
118. Compare Hernandez, 94 P.3d at 1088–89 (admitted uncharged gang-affiliation
evidence in the defendant’s trial on the underlying offenses “to show a motive for the
crime”), with United States v. Morley, 199 F.3d 129, 133 (3d Cir. 1999) (“A propo-
nent’s incantation of the proper uses of such evidence under the rule does not magi-
cally transform inadmissible evidence into admissible evidence.”), and United States
v. Varoudakis, 233 F.3d 113 (1st Cir. 2000) (denying the government’s motive evi-
dence proffered under Rule 404(b) for other crimes, wrongs or acts). “When prior
bad act evidence is offered to prove a motive for the crime, ‘courts must be on guard
to prevent the motive label from being used to smuggle forbidden evidence of pro-
pensity to the jury.’” Id. at 120 (citing United States v. Utter, 97 F.3d 509, 514 (11th
Cir. 1996)).
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ple, appellate cases routinely deny relief based upon a review of the
sufficiency of the evidence in support of motive enhancements like
gang enhancements.119 The prosecution routinely calls an expert to
testify about the activities of the gang and the defendant’s affiliation
and status as a member on the elements of the offense. But it extends
way beyond the categories of evidence a defendant could expect even
if the court permitted, under the rules of evidence like Rule 404(b),
evidence of motive to commit the crime. Conceptually, there is little
to no overlap in the areas within the Venn diagram depicting the evi-
dence presented at trial related to the elements and motive
enhancement.
Some courts put forward legal fiction in support of their contention
that evidence in support of a motive enhancement is independently
admissible at the trial. Some trial courts clumsily cite the last case to
permit motive evidence or, more broadly, evidence in support of a
motive enhancement without case-by-case analysis. Then there are
courts that, like the Court of Appeals in California in Hernandez,
overtly strain standards and rules to admit evidence supporting motive
enhancement at the same trial and same time as the underlying trial on
the merits.120 Hernandez held that even if not independently admissi-
ble, motive enhancement evidence will be admitted into evidence un-
less it is “so extraoridinarily prejudicial . . . that it threatens to sway
the jury to convict.”121
Accordingly, we must treat sentencing enhancements that require
proof of motive—gang and hate enhancements—differently.122 Mo-
tive evidence is sometimes part of the criminal trial, sometimes not.
Sentencing enhancements based upon motive must not tilt evidence of
questionable admissibility in favor of the government. A new tier of
classification for non-inherent enhancement should be added to the
sentencing enhancement discussion. Courts must segregate evidence
of motive enhancements, like evidence of death penalty determination
and criminal history, to avoid continued improper character evidence
and unfair prejudice to the accused at trial.
119. See e.g., People v. Zavala, No. H036028, 2013 WL 5720149, at *23–25 (Cal. Ct.
App. Oct. 22, 2013) (unpublished) (citing Hernandez and holding that the defendant
did not meet his burden on appeal to demonstrate that the trial court’s denial of
bifurcation violated his due process rights); cf. People v. Villeda, No. B230494, 2012
WL 4459931, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2012) (unreported case) (distinguishing
Hernandez on the grounds that the defendant had not “injected his gang affiliation
into the crimes: [he] neither announced or otherwise referenced the gang when com-
mitting the robberies”).
120. Hernandez, 94 P.3d at 1086.
121. Id.; cf. CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 2011) (covering undue prejudice, akin to
the Federal Rules of Evidence).
122. Hernandez, 94 P.3d at 1086.
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IV. PROCEDURAL “PERFECT STORM” FOR THE ACCUSED
A. The Solution of Some States & Proving a Sentencing
Enhancement at Trial
Following Booker, California opted for the states’ solution.123 Cali-
fornia chose to give its defendants the procedural, constitutional pro-
tections of a jury trial and jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt on
sentencing enhancements that would require an increased sentence.124
Again, California’s decision is well-reasoned in light of the true hold-
ing in Booker.125 States like California, at the time of the decision,
argued that the states’ solution better protected the accused in its
criminal courts, particularly as compared to the federal solution. The
states’ solution and California’s election to follow it should positively
affect the defendant. Yet as argued in this Article, trials on the sen-
tencing enhancements, for some enhancements, with the same jury at
the same time violates the accused’s constitutional rights (still) and the
rules of evidence.
The legislative branch in California can, and should, provide for bi-
furcation procedurally when enacting an enhancement statute. But it
does not. Instead, when the statute is procedurally silent, as is all legis-
lation providing for sentencing enhancements, the bifurcation decision
rests with the trial judge. For most over-worked, under-resourced trial
courts, the bifurcation decision inherently conflicts with their survival
mode of doing more with less.
B. Abuse of Discretion Review of Denied Request to Bifurcate
Appellate courts instead hold that the trial judge did not abuse its
discretion in denying bifurcation related to evidence supporting a mo-
tive enhancement.126 As discussed above, trial courts seldom exercise
their broad discretion to grant defense requests for bifurcation of the
sentencing enhancements.127 By leaving bifurcation to the discretion
of the trial court, California, like others states, failed to divorce the
“trial” of the enhancement from the trial of the underlying offense.128
Following the court’s denial of the defendant’s request to bifurcate,
the trial court improperly admits evidence, such as evidence in sup-
123. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL. CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CALCRIM 3103
(2015), http://www.courts.ca.gov/partners/documents/calcrim_juryins.pdf [http://
perma.cc/QSV5-DJ3W].
124. Id.
125. See supra notes 60–63.
126. See People v. Hernandez, 94 P.3d 1080, 1087 (Cal. 2004) (holding that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by denying bifurcation of robbery trial of gang en-
hancement because a limiting instruction regarding gang evidence is only necessary if
requested by defense counsel).
127. See supra Section III.A.3.
128. See sources cited supra note 109, 121.
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port of a motive enhancement, that would not otherwise be part of the
government’s presentation to prove the underlying crime.
Therefore, when California and other states opt for the states’ solu-
tion, the accused’s constitutional rights to a trial and due process are
violated in a whole new way. At trial, the government’s case got
stronger with the evidence in support of a motive enhancement, while
the accused’s hopes for a fair trial got decidedly weaker. And with
appeal, it gets worse still for the accused. On appeal, high courts in
states like California ratify and offer support to the next waves of trial
judges passing on improper and unfairly prejudicial evidence about
gang and hate group affiliation.129
C. Constitutional Arguments Against Unbifurcated Trials for
Motive Enhancements
1. Defendant’s Right to a (Fair) Trial
Ironically, the constitutional implications argued in this Article mir-
ror the arguments that led to the Court’s decision in Booker: the ac-
cused’s Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury.130 The Booker Court
relied upon the accused’s right to trial to require the government to
prove the enhancements that mandated an increased sentence to have
a jury finding by the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt.131 The
Court’s decision in Booker was based on the defendant’s constitu-
tional right to a fair trial on the sentencing enhancement.132
It should stand to reason that a mandate designed to protect a de-
fendant’s right to fair trial should not so severely adversely impact the
larger trial at issue, the trial on the underlying crime. The Booker
Court gave the accused the right to trial on a sentencing considera-
tion, but then some states implemented the requirement in such a way
to poison the trial on the merits. It has also infected the process lead-
ing up to trial because prosecutors can coerce guilty pleas by threaten-
ing that the accused will face one of these poisoned trials. That is,
without mandatory bifurcation, too many defendants must choose be-
tween an unfair and prejudicial trial and pleading guilty to avoid the
sentencing enhancement.
2. Presumption of Innocence
As discussed below under evidentiary challenges,133 the evidence
offered by the government in support of a motive enhancement can be
overwhelmingly damaging. This includes evidence of unsavory status
and affiliation with groups that trigger an emotional reaction from the
129. See sources cited supra note 109, 121.
130. See sources cited supra note 31, 60.
131. See sources cited supra note 31, 60.
132. See sources cited supra note 31, 60.
133. See infra Section IV.D.
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jury. A criminal defendant must enjoy the presumption of innocence
at his trial “unless and until” the allegations against him are proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.134 That ideal becomes more illusory when
he is cloaked throughout trial with evidence in support of motive
enhancements.
The government, throughout an unbifurcated trial on motive en-
hancements, wheels out evidence about the gang or hate group. Such
evidence extends beyond the four corners of the underlying case on
the merits. It also involves specific acts taken by the defendant and
others in the association that weigh on the defendant as trial pro-
gresses. While all defendants must be presumed innocent, evidence in
support of a motive enhancement can shackle the defendant at trial
and improperly shift the burden to his proving that he is not guilty
despite these associations and his status.
3. Shackles Analogy
It is the duty of the trial court to protect the defendant’s right to a
fair trial and to limit the possibility of unfair prejudice. There can be
no more vivid example of unfair prejudice than that which is created
by physical shackles on the defendant at trial before the jury.135 The
Supreme Court has declared that the stigma of appearing before the
court in handcuffs is so great it can only be done in light of some
“special need” “specific to the defendant on trial.”136 Where the court
fails to provide such justification, “the defendant need not demon-
strate actual prejudice to make out a due process violation.”137 If the
court intends to shackle the defendant, defense counsel must have ad-
equate opportunity to argue against the perceived necessity—because
the unfair prejudice is obvious.138
Akin to public shackling at trial, trial courts, through their treat-
ment of motive enhancements and denied motion to bifurcate, have
effectively compelled the defendant to wear his gang colors or visible
tattoos of his hate group at the unbifurcated trial of the underlying
crime.139 This too should be obvious. In the criminal context, no word
may be more toxic to an accused than “gang.” Gangs are associated,
almost exclusively, with crime—and the most vividly fearsome crime
in society. The government sought to prove exactly what jurors be-
lieve when they hear the word “gang” in court: this defendant on trial
134. People v. Mayo, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 497, 503–04 (Ct. App. 2006).
135. United States v. Apodaca, 843 F.2d 421, 430–31 (10th Cir. 1988); United States
v. Theriault, 531 F.2d 281, 284 (5th Cir. 1976).
136. Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 624 (2005); see also Duckett v. Godinez, 67
F.3d 734, 747 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that due process even prohibits shackling the
defendant during sentencing of a capital trial unless it serves an essential state
interest).
137. Deck, 544 U.S. at 635.
138. See Theriault, 531 F.2d at 285.
139. Id. at 284; Deck, 554 U.S. at 625.
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for a specific crime belongs to a group that commits crime as its foun-
dational purpose. It would not be much worse to make the defendant
wear his gang colors and associate with his fellow gang members live
and in person in front of the jury.
The gang labeling, affiliation, and specific past activities evidence
should be so obviously unconstitutional that we need not go beyond
the vivid imagery that shackles pose. This evidence implicates the ac-
cused’s right to trial on the merits of the underlying offense and his
robbed presumption of innocence during trial.
4. Commenting on the Defendant’s Silence at Trial
Events at trial, including the words of the prosecution, can also un-
dermine the defendant’s presumption of innocence. “[T]he test is
whether, in the circumstances of the particular case, ‘the language
used was manifestly intended or was of such character that the jury
would naturally and necessarily take to be a comment on the failure of
the accused to testify or was of such character that the jury would
naturally and necessarily take it to be so.’”140 In Griffin v. California,
the Court held the prosecution may not comment on a defendant’s
failure to testify when the prosecutor stated, “Essie Mae is dead, she
can’t tell you her side of the story. The defendant won’t.”141
The Court deemed a criminal trial tainted and remanded for retrial
when the events at trial implicated the defendant’s constitutional
rights to include his presumption of innocence and due process right
to have the burden rest with the government to prove its case beyond
a reasonable doubt.142 The prosecutor’s comments during summation
in Griffin directly impacted his unalienable right to remain silent and
to compel the government to prove its case.143 Yet, is that worse than
the trial events that allow the government to introduce gang affiliation
evidence throughout a trial of a robbery or assault? Is not the evi-
dence in support of a motive enhancement at trial more damning to
the accused?
Even oblique references to the defendant’s failure to testify violate
a defendant’s right and undermine the presumption of innocence.144 A
prosecutor’s implication that critical facts in the case have not been
refuted and the only person who had the ability to challenge those
facts was the defendant (who did not testify) was found to violate the
defendant’s presumption of innocence.145 Furthermore, the prosecu-
tion is barred from urging the jury to use the actions of the defendant
140. United States v. Williams, 521 F.2d 950, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (quoting Knowles
v. United States, 224 F.2d 168, 170 (10th Cir. 1955)).
141. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 611, 615 (1965).
142. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970).
143. Griffin, 380 U.S. at 615.
144. United States v. Brown, 546 F.2d 166, 173 (5th Cir. 1977).
145. Runnels v. Hess, 653 F.2d 1359, 1361–62 (10th Cir. 1981).
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during the course of the trial as evidence of guilt when the defendant
has declined to testify.146 The appearance and conduct of the defen-
dant during trial is irrelevant to the question of guilt or innocence
unless the defendant takes the stand.147 Further, the prosecution may
not imply or state that the case would have been brought
regardless.148
The commenting on the defendant’s silence is instructive. One case
opened the door to explore the true constitutional implications of this
extremely common trial practice.149 Thereafter, other courts followed
to push the line even further about government conduct and trial
court process that impinges defendants’ rights. This is precisely what is
needed here. A court must recognize how the routine and typical gov-
ernment evidence offered in support of motive enhancements at un-
bifurcated trials is patently unconstitutional, unfair, and not what the
Court intended in Booker.150
D. The Evidentiary Arguments to Exclude Evidence Supporting
Motive Enhancements
Aside from the constitutional arguments, the evidentiary failures
are significant. The same evidentiary rules that so evidently segregate
death penalty or a criminal history enhancement from the underlying
trial on the merits should dictate the court’s exclusion of evidence sup-
porting motive-based enhancements as well. Lawmakers promulgated
evidence codes and specific rules of evidence to exclude evidence of
the defendant’s other crimes and status in most instances. The rules of
evidence prohibit introducing any evidence for the purpose of show-
ing the defendant’s propensity to commit crimes.151 Other convictions
are irrelevant, improper character evidence, and unfairly prejudicial
to the defendant.152 Even when the defendant testifies at trial, his
prior convictions in many jurisdictions remain inadmissible to im-
peach his credibility.153 Other convictions most often bear no rele-
vance to the offense conduct at issue during a criminal trial and make
no fact of consequence more or less probable. Lastly, other convic-
146. United States v. Carroll, 678 F.2d 1208, 1210 (4th Cir. 1982).
147. Cunningham v. Perini, 655 F.2d 98, 100 (6th Cir. 1981).
148. United States v. Bess, 593 F.2d 749, 755–56 (6th Cir. 1979).
149. See sources cited supra note 141.
150. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005).
151. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404(a) (isolating to prove propensity as the improper
purpose for all character evidence).
152. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 401, 403, 404(a) (proscribing evidence that is irrele-
vant, improper character evidence and unfairly prejudicial).
153. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 609(a) (describing the balancing test that favors inad-
missibility for the defendant’s felonies when testifying as a witness).
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tions are highly prejudicial and likely substantially outweigh any pro-
bative value of the evidence to the government.154
Admissible trial evidence must relate to a fact of consequence.155
Typically, trial testimony and admitted evidence relate to an element
of the offense charged (elemental evidence) or other common areas of
proof in a criminal trial, such as identity, jurisdiction, and witness
credibility (other criminal trial evidence). The court, through its evi-
dentiary decisions, defines which trial evidence fits within these pa-
rameters during a jury trial. The court typically does not permit
otherwise inadmissible evidence before the jury because it serves a
purpose elsewhere in the criminal justice process. For example, infor-
mation supporting a bail determination or motion to withdraw an at-
torney need not go before a jury at trial—the information does not
bear on the jury’s verdict and, worse, it could prejudice the defendant.
By contrast, evidence of a sentencing enhancement can sometimes
relate to the offense but other times may relate to a separate and dis-
tinct allegation that is not an element of the crime. The sentencing
enhancement similarly does not relate to common items of proof in a
criminal trial such as jurisdiction, identity, and witness credibility.
Before the rampant enactment of sentencing enhancements, the gov-
ernment did not need enhancement evidence to prove criminal cases
at trial. In fact, prior to sentencing enhancements, trial courts more
often rejected arguments by prosecutors to admit today’s enhance-
ment evidence as contributing to proof at a criminal trial. Therefore,
enhancement evidence supports an independent finding by the judge
or jury that usually, and historically, does not relate to the elements of
the underlying offense and other criminal proof.
The government’s evidence in support of a motive enhancement
similarly puts a defendant’s status on trial and clouds his offense con-
duct with improper character evidence expressly introduced for pro-
pensity. The illustration of California’s gang enhancement applies
here because it extends beyond evidence of prior crimes of the defen-
dant to evidence of the crimes of his organizational affiliation and asso-
ciates. That evidence too is irrelevant, improper character, unfairly
prejudicial, and definitely not inextricably intertwined with the antici-
pated evidence in support of the underlying criminal charges.
Yet, the judiciary has handled motive enhancements far differently
from criminal history enhancements because of procedure and per-
ceived inconvenience. The trial court can no longer continue to allow
the prosecution to present this type of motive-based evidence at the
trial on the defendant’s underlying crime. The court’s interests in judi-
154. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403 (allowing evidence of other crimes requires notice,
a controverted trial issue, unfair prejudice balancing, and specific jury instructions, if
allowed); FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (referencing “motive” as an acceptable “other pur-
pose” from propensity, the only federal rule to do so).
155. See FED. R. EVID. 401(b).
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cial economy cannot justify allowing the prosecution to muddy the
accused’s trial with the most unfairly prejudicial evidence imaginable
in a criminal case—gang and hate-group affiliation, status, and unre-
lated conduct. When the trial court conflates the reasoning for drasti-
cally different classifications of sentencing enhancement, the entire
process becomes infected with unconstitutionality and fundamental
unfairness to the accused. Faced with a single, tainted trial, most de-
fendants—even those with a viable defense—will plead guilty to avoid
the prospect of increased punishment.156
In some jurisdictions, the prosecutor may introduce enhancement
evidence, such as the vagaries of what “benefits a gang” or “hate”
motivation,157 at the same trial as the (unrelated) underlying offense.
The enhancement evidence then will dictate whether the defendant
effectively can proceed to trial on the (unrelated) underlying offense.
Even though the enhancement evidence does not support and is not
needed to prove the elements of the crime or refute a trial defense, it
taints the defendant’s fundamental right to a jury trial and notions of
fairness in criminal trial process that it was intended to preserve. The
trial court must exclude evidence that violates a criminal defendant’s
constitutional guarantees of a fair trial or presents dangers of unfair
prejudice that substantially outweigh the probative value of the
evidence.
Despite the arguments from prosecutors and appellate courts’ justi-
fications, the enhancement evidence in these cases have little, if any,
factual overlap with the evidence at a trial of the underlying offense
alone. Yet, as argued below, California—both its legislature and then
judiciary—exemplifies the precise problem that results after a state
fails to consider the necessary procedural requirements that must ac-
company a motive sentencing enhancement such as gang and “hate”
enhancements.158
E. The Illustration of California’s Gang Enhancement
In 1988, California enacted the Street Terrorism Enforcement and
Prevention Act, commonly known as the STEP Act.159 The Legisla-
ture’s purpose and intent in enacting STEP was clearly written in the
156. By illustration, if we return to the facts described in the Introduction, the pros-
ecutor would inform the young man and his defense counsel pretrial that, at the jury
trial he demands, the defendant will face the felony assault charge and a sentencing
enhancement based upon the young man’s motive to commit the assault. See supra
Part I. Defense counsel will request separate, bifurcated trials for the assault charge
and enhancement allegation. The court, faced with presiding over two trials or one,
will exercise its discretion and deny the defendant’s request to bifurcate.
157. See THE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON HATE CRIME 25 (Nathan Hall et al.
eds., 2015) (“The calls for enhanced punishment chimed with their political objective
to appear ‘tough on crime.’”).
158. See supra Section IV.E.
159. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.20–.26 (West 2014).
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Legislative Findings and Declarations that precede the statute.160
There, the Legislature declared California to be “in a state of crisis
which has been caused by violent street gangs whose members
threaten, terrorize, and commit a multitude of crimes against the
peaceful citizens of their neighborhoods.”161 The perceived crisis in
California was so severe that STEP was the first statute in the United
States to criminalize participation in criminal street gang activity.162
The STEP Act aimed to combat street gangs in several ways, two of
which are notable here: by creating the substantive crime of participa-
tion or membership in a criminal gang and creating a scheme of prison
enhancements for crimes that “benefit or promote” the gang, regard-
less of the accused’s actual membership in said gang.163 Specifically,
section 186.22(a) created the substantive crime of “active[ ] par-
ticipat[ion] in any criminal street gang with knowledge that its mem-
bers engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity,
and who willfully promotes, furthers, or assists in any felonious crimi-
nal conduct by members of that gang. . . .”164 To prove an enhance-
ment under Penal Code section 186.22(b)(1), the State must establish
“criminal street gang,” “primary activities,” “pattern of criminal gang
activity,” or “specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any crimi-
nal conduct by gang members.”165
The State of California and its “for the benefit of . . . any gang”
enhancement (CA gang enhancement) are illustrative.166 In People v.
Jose Pablo Hernandez, the prosecution alleged that Hernandez com-
mitted a robbery under California’s state penal code.167 Hernandez
allegedly approached two victims in a car, demanding money from the
victims, dragged one victim out of the car and choked the victim
160. § 186.21.
161. Id.
162. Beth Bjerregaard, The Constitutionality of Anti-Gang Legislation, 21 CAMP-
BELL L. REV. 31, 32 (1998).
163. § 186.22(a)–(b).
164. § 186.22(a). “The STEP Act has been amended many times since it was first
enacted.” People v. Hernandez, 94 P.3d 1080, 1084 n.2. (Cal. 2004). As of 2014, pun-
ishment for violations of subsection (a) are imprisonment, “for a period not to exceed
one year, or by imprisonment in the state prison for 16 months, or two or three
years.” § 186.22(a). The following section created the “gang enhancement” scheme,
which increased punishment for crimes committed for “benefit of, at the direction of,
or in association with any criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote,
further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members . . . .” § 186.22(b). The
statutory scheme for enhancements under subsection (b) is more complex than for
subsection (a). See § 186.22(a)–(b). Section 186.22(b) states that, notwithstanding cer-
tain exceptions, the enhancement is an “additional term of two, three, or four years at
the court’s discretion.” § 186.22(b)(1)(A). Furthermore, § 186.22(b) also states that
the enhancement for a “serious” underlying felony is five years, and the enhancement
for a “violent” underlying felony is ten years. § 186.22(b)(1)(B)–(C).
165. § 186.22(a), (e), (f).
166. § 186.22(b)(1).
167. People v. Hernandez, 94 P.3d 1080, 1084 (Cal. 2004).
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before he stole the victim’s necklace, and pointed a knife at the vic-
tim’s neck.168
While the robbery allegation relates to any wrongful taking or theft
where force was used, the government would not need to prove that a
“dangerous or deadly weapon” was used as an element of the
crime.169 Instead, the prosecution alleges the knife used was a danger-
ous or deadly weapon as a sentencing enhancement.170 The dangerous
weapon enhancement made part of Hernandez’s trial,171 however,
does not pose any of the evidentiary or unfairness problems high-
lighted in this Article. Under any evidentiary analysis, the weapon was
inevitably part of the government’s trial presentation irrespective of
its sentencing impact. Because the weapon enhancement had no nega-
tive impact on Hernandez’s trial, it is not at issue in the appellate
decision.
By contrast, like the movie theater assault illustration above,172 the
prosecution further alleged that Hernandez committed his armed rob-
bery “for the benefit of a criminal street gang,” a sentencing
enhancement.173
The government’s proof of a gang enhancement can be expansive.
Hernandez allegedly said to his victim, “You don’t know who you are
dealing with,” and then told her “Hawthorne Little Watts,” a known
criminal street gang in Los Angeles.174 Even if that evidence were ad-
duced at the trial of the underlying robbery, the witnesses’ recital of
the defendant’s statements is not enough. Witness accounts are rou-
tinely accompanied by expert testimony, as they were in Her-
nandez.175 The gang expert then delves into matters that would never
become part of the underlying robbery trial.176
Discretionary bifurcation is the system that California has adopted
for gang enhancements. The plain language of the STEP Act does not
require bifurcation, and courts have declined to impute this require-
ment into the statute.177 This is markedly different from the court’s
168. Id. at 1083.
169. Id. at 1083–84.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See supra Part I.
173. Hernandez, 94 P.3d at 1084; CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(b)(1) (West 2014).
174. Hernandez, 94 P.3d at 1083.
175. Id.
176. See id.
177. The authority to bifurcate criminal trial issues in California is grounded in the
California Penal Code section 1044, which gives the trial court broad discretion to
control the conduct of a criminal trial. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1044 (West 2008). The
defendant can move to have a trial bifurcated under section 352 of the evidence code,
on the grounds that the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighs its probative
value. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 2011). As in federal court, review of a trial
court’s decision not to bifurcate is one of abuse of discretion. See People v. Jordan,
721 P.2d 79, 82 (Cal. 1986). A trial court abuses its discretion when it “exercise[s] its
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view of bifurcation with respect to prior convictions, in which case
bifurcation, while still discretionary, is more readily authorized due to
its recognized prejudicial effect. However, “[n]othing in section 186.22
suggests the street gang enhancement should receive special treatment
of the kind given prior convictions.”178
This view, adopted by the Hernandez court, has continued to domi-
nate the reasoning with regard to bifurcation of gang enhancements.
Nevertheless, the Hernandez court cautions that some gang evidence
may be unduly prejudicial, especially with regard to predicate acts
(those not committed by the defendant, but used to establish the crim-
inal activities of the gang).179 This type of evidence could be so inflam-
matory and prejudicial that bifurcation would be warranted. The court
further noted, “[m]oreover, some of the other gang evidence, even as
it relates to the defendant, may be so extraordinarily prejudicial, and
of so little relevance to guilt, that it threatens to sway the jury to con-
vict regardless of the defendant’s actual guilt.”180
Carrying forward the illustration of California’s gang enhancement,
bifurcation of a gang enhancement from a common law crime like
robbery is warranted when the defendant can clearly establish that
proof of the enhancement, including the pattern of offenses by him or
his associates, offered is unduly prejudicial. This is a fairly uniform
standard in evidence—the judicial balancing of probative value and
unfairly prejudicial effect of evidence. The Hernandez court showed
its hand as it began to contort the unfair prejudice rules consistent
with most evidence codes and under California’s Rule 352.181 In Her-
nandez, the appellate court held that the pattern of gang activity evi-
dence must be “so extraordinarily prejudicial and of so little relevance
to guilt that it threatens to sway the jury to convict regardless of the
defendant’s actual guilt.”182 The “threaten to sway the verdict” lan-
guage shifts an evidentiary determination by the trial court into a
harmless error standard of review by an appellate court.183
As argued in this Article, even under the Hernandez court’s re-
framed unfair prejudice standard, proof of an unrelated pattern of
gang evidence has no relevance to guilt, is extraordinarily prejudicial,
and does threaten to sway the verdict on the underlying robbery alle-
gation—jurors simply would more likely convict on the robbery after
learning of the defendant’s gang affiliation and that gang’s activities,
which include robberies. Because the expert testimony and pattern of
offenses required to prove the gang enhancement are so unrelated to
discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that result[s] in a
manifest miscarriage of justice.” Id.
178. Hernandez, 94 P.3d at 1085.
179. See id. at 1086.
180. Id.
181. See id. at 1085–87.
182. Id. at 1086 (emphasis added).
183. See id.
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the crime—or even the defendant—proof of the gang enhancement
must have its own day with a jury at trial.
Hernandez asserts there is less need for bifurcation of a gang en-
hancement than there is for bifurcation of a prior conviction enhance-
ment allegation.184 Several cases assert that the implication of
prejudice is dispelled and that the need for bifurcation is unnecessary
when the evidence that supports the enhancement would also be ad-
missible to prove guilt in the underlying crime.185
The court asserted that a defendant must show that the trial judge
abused discretion in denying bifurcation.186 The court also asserts
there is less call for bifurcation of a gang enhancement than a prior
conviction.187 Even prior to Hernandez, many California courts found
bifurcation unnecessary. In People v. Martin, the trial court was found
to have properly denied bifurcation because witnesses and evidence
proving murder and gang enhancement were the same.188 And People
v. Funes found that there was no need for bifurcation because the evi-
dence necessary to prove the gang enhancement and evidence rele-
vant to prove motive, malice, premeditation, and intent were one-in-
the-same.189 While in People v. Gutierrez, the court determined that
applying limiting instructions to evidence was more favorable than
completely severing the trial.190
The abuse of discretion standard under California Evidence Code
Rule 352 has been firmly adopted with regard to review of the trial
courts’ decision to bifurcate trials for California gang enhancements.
To avoid an abuse of discretion challenge, courts should bifurcate the
gang enhancement issue only when the evidence is extremely prejudi-
cial and has little relevance to guilt.191 In such a case, the gang en-
hancement should be bifurcated.192 However, the courts have
repeatedly found that the evidence supporting the gang enhancement
is relevant to, and would be admissible at, a trial for guilt, making
bifurcation unnecessary and dispelling claims of prejudice.
In so finding, the courts have reflexively repeated that the evidence
relative to the gang enhancement charge is “inextricably intertwined
with the offense” and relevant to prove any one of motive, malice,
premeditation, specific intent, identity, modus operandi, or as part of
184. Id.
185. Id.; see, e.g., People v. Martin, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 660, 662–63 (Ct. App. 1994).
186. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
187. See Hernandez, 94 P.3d at 1083.
188. Martin, 28 Cal. App. 2d at 662.
189. People v. Funes, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 758, 764–66 (Ct. App. 1994).
190. People v. Gutierrez, 200 P.3d 847 (Cal. 2009).
191. E.g., Scott v. Marshall, No. CV 09-1976-GHK (JEM), 2010 WL 546360, at *5–6
(C.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2010).
192. Id.
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the defendant’s use of force or fear.193 Some of these are elements of
the underlying crime, and others are factors that the prosecution will
use to rebut witnesses, reply to a defense, or otherwise carry its bur-
den of proof. In fact, the perceived need for the prosecution to estab-
lish motive (which is not an element of the underlying crime) is
considered to be of such importance that courts have allowed gang
evidence to be admitted for that purpose, even if prejudicial.
Given the deferential standard of review and the oft-cited belief
that most gang enhancement evidence would have been introduced at
trial anyway, it is little wonder that, as of 2012, no courts in California
have ever found that the trial court abused its discretion by not man-
dating bifurcation. However, the courts have repeatedly found that
the evidence supporting the gang enhancement is “elemental,” mak-
ing bifurcation unnecessary and dispelling claims of prejudice.194 In so
finding, the courts have reflexively repeated that the evidence relative
to the gang enhancement charge is “inextricably intertwined with the
offense” and relevant to prove any one of motive, malice, premedita-
tion, specific intent, identity, modus operandi, or as part of the defen-
dant’s use of force or fear.195 Some of these are elements of the
underlying crime, and others are factors that the prosecution will use
to rebut witnesses, reply to a defense, or otherwise carry its burden of
proof.
Not surprisingly, since Hernandez, no appellate court has held in a
published decision that a trial court abused its discretion by denying
bifurcation of the gang enhancement. Most cases have found the court
did not abuse discretion in denying bifurcation of robbery trial from
gang enhancement—and cite Hernandez. The truth is, even prior to
Hernandez, many California courts denied the defendant’s request for
bifurcation because witnesses and evidence proving murder and gang
enhancement were the same.196
V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
A. Change Local Rules and Practice
Although part of a larger critique of our criminal justice system, we
need not wait for the legislators and appellate courts to effect change
with practices that so clearly infringe upon the criminal defendant’s
individual rights. Every trial court has the autonomy and authority to
establish rules to protect the parties, particularly the accused, and pre-
serve the integrity of the jury trial system in the name of fairness and
193. People v. Hernandez, 94 P.3d 1080, 1085 (Cal. 2004); see also, e.g., People v.
Zabalza, No. D058181, 2012 WL 748674, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2012)
(unpublished).
194. Zabalza, 2012 WL 748674, at *9.
195. Id.
196. People v. Martin, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 660, 663 (Ct. App. 1994); People v. Funes,
28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 758, 764–65 (Ct. App. 1994).
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justice. Courts, and even individual judges, publish rules of procedure
and substantive law as their “local rules.” Trial courts could lead the
charge on wrongful convictions by guilty plea and motive sentencing
enhancements through their own local rules.
Many local rules merely reflect judicial idiosyncrasies and pet
peeves of the chief judge or individual courtroom. Local rules in crim-
inal cases are aimed at protecting the rights of the accused. As recom-
mended below, the trial court can unilaterally impose binding rules
related to limitations related to proving sentencing enhancements, a
guilty plea colloquy, or mandatory bifurcation for motive enhance-
ments. Urging legislators to consider individual rights does not win
elections. Arguing that appellate courts should about face on their
prior decisions means to endure years of the status quo and too many
more coerced guilty pleas. Trial courts can represent the change that
the criminal justice system needs with motive enhancements and re-
sulting wrongful convictions by guilty plea.
B. Defendant’s Election Provisions
Some court must acknowledge the gift horse that the Booker deci-
sion has turned into for the accused in the motive enhancement con-
text. That is, some court or action group must be able to see that the
accused’s underlying trial and his fate are overrun by mere sentencing
considerations. If Booker conferred jury trial and jury findings beyond
a reasonable doubt to protect the constitutional rights of the accused
at trial and, as applied, the same rights to fair trial and due process
have suffered, then an election by the defendant seems logical. That is,
the defendant should enjoy the right to choose between an untainted
jury trial on the underlying trial and a finding by a jury on the
enhancement.
If the defendant elects the untainted trial, then he necessarily
waives the right to a trial on the evidence supporting the motive en-
hancement. The motive enhancement could then be found by the
court by the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant
essentially gets the bifurcation but not the jury finding on the en-
hancement. It would not be a rubber-stamp process because the gov-
ernment would need to provide witnesses and evidence to meet the
higher standard at sentencing. The focus under this recommendation
is on the Booker Court’s call for a higher burden of proof rather than
a jury finding.
C. Change Plea Colloquy Rules
If criminal justice has been reduced to a “charge and plea system,”
then should we not require more from the most critical hearing before
sentencing: the change of plea hearing. Rules of procedure set forth
the script of matters that the court must or should review with the
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defendant before he pleads guilty. Some procedural rules concerning
the plea colloquy aim to protect the defendant’s individual rights or
ensure that the defendant knows his constitutional rights forfeited by
the guilty plea. Local rules or, with some patience, changes to respec-
tive criminal rules of procedure, can require more from a court during
a guilty plea colloquy. Specifically, as to sentencing enhancements, the
court should be required to inquire into additional charges and en-
hancements beyond the offense to which the defendant is pleading
guilty.
The problem with the current rules concerning the court’s plea col-
loquy with the court is they largely focus on the offense of conviction
to the exclusion of all other circumstances that brought the defendant
to the decision to plead guilty. Once a defendant pleads guilty, the
court could inquire about the discussion between the government and
the defense to include discussion about additional charges, threatened
enhancements, potential defendants known to them, or other informa-
tion. Knowing that the court will explore the totality of the pretrial
negotiations may help curb improper government behavior and sub
rosa agreements and threats.
D. Place the Burden on the Government to Prove Why Bifurcation
is not Necessary
So much of the deck is stacked against the accused during the crimi-
nal trial. Procedurally, trial courts can tweak the burden and burden-
shifting related to trial motions, particularly those within its discretion
to grant or deny. The accused’s constitutional rights to a trial and due
process are at issue, and the evidence in support of the motive en-
hancements is so damning, it is a small concession to ask the govern-
ment to articulate why our criminal justice system cannot have two
phases of trial with the same jury. Like death penalty, asset forfeiture,
and cases implicating the insanity defense in some states, we seat a
single jury and explain to them that their collective work in this case
will come in two phases if necessary.
The results may be akin to too many trials on the motive enhance-
ments occurring simultaneously with the trials on the underlying
crimes. It would be the Author’s hope, however, that occasionally the
trial judge or even the government may see the value of a bifurcated
trial.
E. Require Mandatory Bifurcation Provisions
for Motive Enhancements
The least likely option is that the lawmakers could insert the proce-
dural safeguards that they neglected to include when they passed the
comprehensive crime bill that included the sentencing enhancement
language to support their “tough-on-crime” labeling.
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F. Provide Guidance to Treat Motive Enhancements Differently
As argued throughout, we need to fashion a new analysis and classi-
fication for certain sentencing enhancements that have infected the
trial process from plea negotiations to sentencing. We need to treat
motive enhancements differently to preserve the accused’s constitu-
tional rights at trial and curtail the wrongful convictions occurring be-
cause of this process. Sometimes all it takes is one legislator, one
appellate court, one trial judge, or one person to suggest a necessary
change to a broken process that has run far afoul from its intended
beginnings.
